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Cultures in Europe and Central Asia have changed dramatically since the beginning of the 
transition to democracy and an open society. Education used to be free of private cost. It 
no longer is. Income inequality has increased; the private cost of public education may be 
burdensome to low-income families, whose children may face discrimination at school. The 
societies facing these problems, however, are becoming more open to discussing them. 
What does the growth in private contributions to public education mean? Is it a sign of 
corruption in school systems where it occurs? Is it an indication that the relevant authorities 
have abrogated their responsibility? Is it a normal reaction to a collapse in public expendi-
tures? Or considering that OECD countries encourage private payments to public education 
and even track them through official statistics, are private contributions to public education 
a normal phenomenon in a mature democracy? Under what conditions should private pay-
ments for public education be outlawed or encouraged? This report summarizes the issues 
behind these questions and concludes that public policy on private contributions to public 
education should be divided into different categories and that public policy should differ 
depending upon which category of private contribution is being considered. 
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When some states of Europe and Central Asia were governed by socialist parties, 
citizens of these states took pride in their systems of free public education. Children of 
peasants and workers, intellectuals, and managers all attended school without charge, from 
kindergarten (where available) to university; and this right was guaranteed by the state con-
stitution. There were, of course, hidden costs. These may have included school uniforms, 
flowers as annual gifts for teachers, and in-kind contributions for making repairs on the 
school and the like. However, none of these “traditional costs” was considered to be a barrier 
to educational opportunity.
During the first stage of the transition, beginning in the early 1990s, national econo-
mies underwent an unprecedented collapse. Industries, agricultural land, and housing were 
shifted from public to private ownership; inflation took a toll on the value of savings and 
pensions, poverty increased, and a significant number of services—heat, utilities, trans-
port, health, and education—could no longer be provided at the same price. Costs for these 
services to individuals increased. Fees were charged where before none had existed and 
increased where they had been modest. 
A decade into the transition, many if not most of the countries of Europe and Cen-
tral Asia enjoyed increased prosperity. Where there were resources, such as petroleum 
in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, public services began to return to former levels. In some 
instances, such as in Georgia, strong macroeconomic management helped stabilize the 
economy and provide a modestly positive economic outlook. In other cases such as Slovakia 
and Latvia, strong macroeconomic management combined with the assistance associated 
with joining the European Union allowed for the second stage of the transition to occur 
earlier and more vigorously. Lastly, in cases such as Tajikistan and Moldova, a modest and 
precarious macroeconomic stability has been achieved without the benefits of commodifi-
able resources or external assistance.
Despite these differences among the countries studied, this project set out to inves-
tigate the degree to which compulsory education relied on private parental payments. Most 
countries make a top priority of expenditure for compulsory public education and constitu-
tionally guarantee that education is free. However there is no uniform consensus on what 
specific costs should be covered under “free education.”1 
Are significant contributions from parents more likely to be made in countries with 
weaker economies, such as Tajikistan and Moldova? Or because of cultural change, are 
private payments increasing even in countries where the economy is strong and macro-
economic prospects better? For what purpose are these informal payments made? Are they 
directed primarily at school functions, such as visits to museums, which augment normal 
pedagogical routines, or are they directed at essential functions such as school maintenance, 
which would ordinarily fall within the state’s purview? 
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To what extent do these payments constitute a form of corruption?2 For instance, do 
they pose educational barriers to poorer children? Do they single out for ridicule or teas-
ing those children whose families cannot afford to contribute? Are they intended to garner 
special assistance for the child of the family making the contribution instead of benefiting 
a whole class or school? 
Since payments were “informal,” it was anticipated that they would not likely be 
regularized into school accounts, and that the parties to transactions would have different 
views of their frequency. School directors might have one point of view, teachers another, 
parents a third. To what extent are such differences common across countries? Is there likely 
to be greater agreement on the kinds of payments being made in some countries than in 
others?
Informal Payments in a Global Context
The issue of parental informal payments is not widely studied. There has been some discus-
sion about free education with respect to educational decentralization (Bray, 2007), but pre-
vious studies addressed the question of tuition. A free education for every child is considered 
a basic human right. The former socialist countries have adopted tuition-free compulsory 
education in their new constitutions even as some countries have undergone a shift from 
a highly centralized to a more decentralized system. At the same time, the cost per student 
has increased with rising costs for public utilities and school equipment, and state budgets 
no longer reliably cover basic educational needs. 
Since all parents want their child to remain in school, they constitute a highly moti-
vated group to which the cost burden can be shifted. There is little agreement as to what 
constitutes a free education. Should it include a classroom with no heat? Should it exclude 
textbooks and other school supplies? Should it exclude transportation and school lunches? 
Should it exclude fees charged by teachers for extra tutoring which in some cases amount to 
graft (Dawson, 2009)? Some countries have studied this issue (SKDS, 1999), but consensus 
over what constitutes parental payments to schooling has not yet been reached. 
One important consideration is that personal views of informal payments may change. 
Many in the region used to view any informal payment as being a deviation from an ideal 
that obtained under the socialist system. From this perspective all informal payments may 
be treated, albeit informally, as an abrogation of state responsibility. In some cases, informal 
payments were considered to be signs of “corruption” on the grounds that only a corrupt 
state would abrogate its public responsibilities.3 
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Gradually, however, views may be shifting. Even in wealthy industrialized democ-
racies, families make private contributions to augment the state support of primary and 
secondary education. In Spain, for instance, private contributions constitute 12 percent of 
total educational expenditures. In Japan and the United States, they constitute 9 percent; in 
France, 7 percent; in the United Kingdom and Canada, 5 percent. (Matheson et al., 1996). 
If these wealthy and sophisticated countries all treat private contributions to compulsory 
education as normal, many now feel, it would be unrealistic to expect countries in the 
Europe and Central Asia region to return to the social contract which applied in the era of 
state socialism (Matheson et al., 1996). 
Drawing the Line
A group of education-policy researchers from across Eurasia, knowing that there was no 
returning to an earlier era and seeking a better informed public policy on parental informal 
payments for education, chose to study the issue, both in a national and cross-regional 
context. 
While their original intention may have been to propose solutions to the problem, 
they slowly shifted to understanding the process as a whole. Rather than dictate to the 
public what must be done, they learned that the practice of informal payments requires a 
collaborative response. 
Linked through the Network of Education Policy Centers, the team had already worked 
together on projects that had both research and advocacy components. Understanding how 
the practice of informal payments is woven into others involving households, schools, and 
governments, they knew that reform required a different approach. 
The report Drawing the Line describes that approach. Its research focuses on distinc-
tive aspects of informal payments as a social practice, with special attention to its scope, 
motivation for involvement, and impact. Since informal payments are widely accepted but 
rarely open for public review, “drawing the line” means that all of those with a stake in pub-
lic education must discuss and decide what should and should not be done about informal 
payments. This report is an attempt to explain to communities the importance of informed 
decision making in drawing their particular lines. 
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1. In some instances, the constitutional guarantee of free education can be interpreted as 
covering tuition, but not fees. 
2. The definition of education corruption is behavior which is illegal or unprofessional or 
both (Heyneman, 2004; Hallak and Poisson, 2007). 
3. While it is true that the state constitution in many postsocialist countries (e.g., Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan) guarantees a free education, informally private payments are widely 





Informal payments for education can either be a welcome additional resource for schools or 
serve as an emergency measure to be employed when other resources are insufficient. Pay-
ments as supplementary resources are more common in nations where education and other 
social institutions are stable, while countries undergoing sustained social and economic 
challenges tend to rely on informal payments to compensate for insufficient state funding. 
This report is about the importance of changing the latter type of informal payments for 
education in countries where it is pervasive to the former, benign type. 
The nations of the former Soviet bloc stretch from Eastern Europe into Central Asia 
and beyond. Each has journeyed into independence over the past two decades, and infor-
mal payments for education, health, and other public services have grown in size and fre-
quency. Sometimes they have been made to cover shortages and sometimes to meet other 
demands. But each of these newly independent nations started in the same place, and face 
common challenges. False starts, noble intentions, and opportunism have been seen across 
the region. 
Informal payments are perplexing to policymakers, community advocates, educators, 
and parents. Until one begins to measure the costs and benefits that these payments have for 
families and societies, the payments can seem solely expedient. It is common, for instance, 
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to hear calls for the system of education financing to return to what it was two decades ago, 
when the state was assumed to be able to care for almost every need. After a review of the 
facts, however, one sees the need to move forward. 
Informal payments that are ignored and unregulated are a sign of a society in trouble. 
When parents pay for services that they feel are promised by the government and constitu-
tion, deep cracks in the system come into the open. Children may be at risk of having access 
to schooling blocked, attention denied them, and instruction time reduced. They may have 
to conduct financial transactions in school and learn to mistrust officials and institutions. 
But informal payments do not necessarily have negative consequences, especially if 
they originate from good will and the intention to serve the schools and the children. They 
can serve to strengthen education while protecting children and serving their best interests. 
The challenge is to support the practice when it is well-intentioned and effective. 
Taking up the Challenge
To guide education-related reform, researchers and educational professionals in countries 
across Eurasia came together as the Network of Education Policy Centers (NEPC) in the 
1990s after individual experiences with the Open Society Institute, UNICEF, and other 
international agencies that supported educational development in the region. Together they 
did research on the rise of private tutoring, early childhood development, and school attri-
tion. By 2006, they found themselves ready to consider the practice of informal payments 
for education. 
As representatives of countries that were once part of the Soviet Union and the East-
ern bloc, each understood his or her shared past and was troubled by the paths taken in 
independence. Over a decade and a half, they had witnessed how parents had begun to pay 
for school heating, maintenance, gifts, bribes, salaries, windows, textbooks, and much more. 
These costs were new expenses since in the Soviet era education was free to families, except 
for the cost of stationery, clothing, and some subsidized services. 
The researchers had also seen schools attempt to get by during the 1990s when 
salaries were not paid, school budgets didn’t cover basic operating costs, and poor mainte-
nance left many schools in horrible states of disrepair. When administrators, teachers, and 
parents had had to work together to keep schools functioning, informal payments became 
a significant resource.
Unfortunately, such changes and adaptations were unregulated. The process of 
financing schooling was haphazard, even within the same country, province, or town. 
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Many decisions in early independence were made in response to emergencies. These swift 
measures often bypassed existing rules and logical procedures. 
Some principals were very successful at bringing in funds. Others, particularly in 
neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment (another new trend), were less so. After 
a decade and a half, though, informal payments had become a part of ordinary life across 
the region. 
The NEPC decided to study the extent of this phenomenon. Seven member organi-
zations volunteered their countries as samples, and together with research coordinators 
planned their approach. They recognized that informal payments played a positive role in 
other education systems. Since informal payments were acknowledged as a part of function-
ing and regulated systems in other countries, they decided to see how such a practice might 
be implemented in their own countries. The Parental Informal Payments for Education 
Study (PIPES) was planned and conducted in 2006. 
Each of the countries represented here—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Moldova, Slovakia, and Tajikistan—became independent in the early 1990s. Each has 
had its own experience with independence but all began from the same point. With their 
socialist heritage, they are learning to account for the costs of transition and also to reform 
their education systems with the aim of stability at home and competitiveness in global 
markets.
While the initial hope of the research team was to discover what must happen with 
informal payments across Eurasia, the study slowly shifted to focus on understanding the 
process as a larger whole. Rather than prepare a one-size-fits-all formula, they learned that 
the solution to informal payments requires a collaborative response, while each country’s 
response must be tailored to fit local needs and contexts.
The results provide a template from which local populations, schools, and govern-
ments may determine which forms of informal payments are appropriate and inappropriate. 
This template begins by drawing the line between these two.
Drawing the Line
The team of researchers, linked together through national members of the Network 
of Education Policy Centers, had already worked together in the investigation of other 
educational phenomena and the conduct of advocacy based on shared results. Since they 
learned how informal payments are woven into other aspects of society—households, 
schools, and government—they knew that reforms required a different approach. 
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Drawing the line is that approach. It signifies that this research highlights distinct 
points about the practice of informal payments, with special attention to its scope, motiva-
tion for involvement, and impact. Since informal payments are widely accepted but rarely 
open for public review, drawing the line means that all stakeholders must discuss and decide 
what should take place and what should not. 
The title of this report arises from discussions about how to analyze the data gener-
ated by the PIPES study. By drawing the line, we mean to understand the difference between 
the positive and negative implications of informal payments. The central concern is how to 
ensure that education reform accounts for the real cost of education and creates an equitable 
system that is accessible to all. 
This report is an attempt to explain to communities the importance of informed deci-
sion making in drawing their particular lines. The goal is to accurately represent all of the 
participating countries, clearly display the research findings, and integrate contextual issues 
outside of education. It is divided into six chapters. This introduction is the first chapter. 
The second chapter outlines the exploratory study that serves as the basis for the rest 
of the book. After a review of the challenges inherent in any study of corruption in education, 
the research design, including methodology and sampling, are presented. 
The results of the survey are presented in the third chapter. It reviews the preliminary 
conclusions of this study as they concern education finance, school management, house-
hold expenses and ethics before detailing responses to our inquiry into the motivations for, 
and scope and impact of, informal payments. The final section reviews the implications of 
several major findings about informal payments, including their presence as a widespread 
norm, school dependence on them, the role of parents in them, the reasons for their rise, 
and their potential to impose economic hardship as well as to limit educational access, 
equity, and quality. 
Chapter four steps away from the study to look at Eurasia as a region and as a subject 
for comparative study. The rise of informal payments is placed within the context of the 
participant countries’ contemporary transition in comparative case studies of each. 
One of the resounding comments from each of the PIPES country reports concerned 
the constitutional right to free education and the seeming failure to deliver on it. The public 
expectation of free education fostered by socialism meant that the citizenry was not often 
involved in education management and financing. It also did not question the origin of 
funds or expect to make personal contributions. In exchange for the free provision of strong 
public education, citizens had to surrender the possibility for choice and participation and 
become passive beneficiaries. 
Chapter four explores the steps that have been taken to shore up public education 
across the region. A critical lesson has been that education is not free. Learning to take 
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responsibility for education and to find mixed funding sources have been crucial steps in 
independence. This chapter explores the real cost of education for these countries. 
The fifth chapter presents a synthesis of conclusions and recommendations from each 
country team.1 After a discussion defining costs and responsibilities for each, we give special 
attention to the matters of payment process, community engagement, and policymaking. 
The challenge for advocacy as change management under public control is discussed as the 
chapter builds toward its primary recommendation of developing accountability for informal 
payments. 
The final chapter returns to the concept of drawing the line and presents a method that 
communities might use for this purpose. Three variables—record, form, and benefit—are 
employed to understand the types of informal payments and to determine which are accept-
able and desirable. Concluding that accountability must be strengthened, the chapter contends 
that records must be kept of nearly all types of informal payments in order to bring them into 
line with expectations and to limit inappropriate, illegal, or unethical transactions. 
The line that must be drawn begins with documentation in order to show what infor-
mal payments are expected, collected, and used. This is essential to create a culture of 
accountability and responsibility. The benefits of this approach are the fostering of trust and 
integrity necessary to the adoption of other reforms, and the establishment of clear records 
of what education costs. These are necessary steps to ensure the satisfactory functioning of 
schools that are open to everyone and able to meet the needs of all students. 
Drawing the line not only refers to establishing accountability, although this is a very 
important step. It also means distinguishing what is desirable and acceptable from what is 
not. Drawing the line is a critical act that promotes transparency, clarity, and engagement. It 
is necessary because, as the remaining chapters will reveal, the struggle involves changing 
individuals’ behavior along with systemic reform. 
PIPES demonstrates the willingness and ability of parents to assist schools and the 
education process as a whole. It also shows that parents recognize the deleterious effects of 
this phenomenon and its relation to other issues like school wastage, private tutoring, and 
corruption in higher education. Parents and school personnel see that children are not being 
well prepared for employment and future success. They also know that at-risk populations 
must be assisted so that they have equal access and opportunity. Responsible action based 
on informed decisions and planning is the objective.
Drawing the line for them is the beginning of real reform. It also provides a way for 
the system to reward appropriate behavior and to sanction improper and unwanted actions. 
Interventions aimed at informal payments, as described in the remaining chapters, also 
promise to create a foundation for other reforms. First, though, we must look at the study 





The central purpose of this research project is to better understand the character and 
frequency of private informal payments made by parents and families on behalf of their 
children attending primary and secondary school. “Informal payments” are not officially 
sanctioned, approved, and/or collected by the state or local government as a prerequisite for 
school attendance. Such payments may include private family costs for uniforms, books, 
and transportation; special activities such as field trips and tutoring services (both legal 
and illegal/extra-legal); and regular education services which are underfunded by the state, 
among others. 
This study is chiefly concerned with payments that fall ambiguously between the 
regularly incurred private costs associated with schooling and those that hinder the general 
access to and quality of compulsory education. There are concerns that the functional integ-
rity of school systems is significantly affected by such payments, particularly when such 
practices are accompanied by a general lack of accountability and oversight. The impact of 
such payments has been perceived to be a major problem for many school systems. Their 
magnitude and frequency, however, are largely unknown.
Also lacking is a general understanding of when and how informal payments made 
on behalf of parents and families are corrupt in practice. Obviously, not all private informal 
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payments are corrupt. But it is not hard to imagine that many kinds of informal payments 
could under certain conditions become corrupt. Knowledge about the occurrence of such 
informal payments will allow us to identify the point at which these kinds of payments 
become deleterious forms of educational corruption.
Studying Corruption in Education
In the past decade, international organizations such as the World Bank, Transparency Inter-
national, the Open Society Institute, USAID, the OECD, UNDP, UNESCO, and NORAD 
have made great strides in establishing a global dialogue on forms of corruption and their 
effects on institutions, individuals, and societies; the prevalence of these forms in different 
countries and regions; best practices and policy initiatives to mitigate corruption; and the 
importance of measuring its different manifestations as a first step toward prevention. Infor-
mal payments in education, though, have not received serious attention until now.
Corruption in Education
When present, corruption defeats the very purpose of education: having a universal 
and open system based on merit, and not money. In a corrupt educational system, 
students do not acquire the skills and knowledge that will enable them to contribute 
meaningfully to their country’s economy and society. They will learn from a young 
age to value corruption, accepting it as a norm for them and society.
—Transparency International, 2007
Research on corruption . . . should also look beyond the formal structures of the 
central state to the informal networks of patronage and social domination that often 
determine how political power actually is wielded, including the local community 
or district level. The concrete interlinkages between state institutions and society 
ought to be probed, to explore the multiple ways in which they influence and shape 
each other.
—Andvig, J.C. and Fjeldstad, O-H 2000
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The PIPES team realized that a study on informal payments is also a study of corrup-
tion, a difficult task in transforming societies. Researching corruption in any sector involves 
challenges typically confronted in social science research, and also includes others. 
Conducting high quality research on corruption is difficult and expensive because of 
the following factors:
 the generally sensitive nature of the topics raised in corruption research
 the fear of sanction for participating in potentially illicit/illegal activities
 disparate power dynamics arising from corrupt behaviors
 inherent vulnerabilities of persons who are affected by corrupt practices 
 the importance placed by many persons on being seen as ethical members of 
society
Moreover, when a project aims to reduce corruption, it is important to define what 
is meant by this goal. A system of education is free of corruption when it 1) ensures equal 
access to compulsory education, 2) equitably distributes educational materials necessary for 
learning, 3) engages in fair and transparent selection of students to schools, 4) maintains 
high professional standards for school administrators and teachers, 5) guarantees that funds 
allocated for education are distributed and spent on education, 6) evaluates student perfor-
mance on the basis of merit and aptitude, and 7) is directly accountable and responsive to 
its constituents—students, parents, and the general public.
Corruption has many different definitions, operates at multiple institutional and 
social levels, encompasses a wide variety of practices, is highly prone to cultural interpre-
tation, manifests in often unpredictable ways, and goes by many names. Trying to define 
the specific form of corruption being researched presents both conceptual and linguistic 
difficulties. 
To aid their design process, the team adopted three basic premises for the PIPES 
research:
1. If education is the prerequisite for the acquisition of social and human capital (and 
social cohesion), then the education system is the institutional mechanism for societal 
development. 
2. The nature and quality of the values, norms, skills, and knowledge that schooling 
produces determines the kind of citizens that students become. 
3. The level of access students and their families have to compulsory schooling has 
much to do with their ability to acquire the means of being productive members 
of society. 
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After establishing this conceptual base, the team reviewed its practical knowledge 
about informal payments, including information about participants, collection, and types. 
Following the Flow
Before generating research questions, the PIPES team tried to model how parental informal 
payments for education are made. Following transaction flows is a practical step in design-
ing research. The team came up with a simple model illustrating that parents are pulled in 
three directions to make payments (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. 
Drawn in Three Directions
This model allowed the team to identify those whom it needed to include in the sur-
vey. Rather than seek out all four groups, it decided to omit parent associations until these 
recently formed bodies gain more experience and standing.2 The team chose to concentrate 
on parents, teachers, and principals. 
Team members understood that listing the types of payments they already knew about 
would be useful to form their questions. This also allowed them to categorize the payments 
as unique or repeating. Identifying a timeline across a child’s education career was also use-
ful in identifying major gatekeeping occasions (Figure 2). 
Teachers:
class needs, presents, 
tutoring, private gain, 
events, grades
Parent Associations:
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Figure 2.
Gatekeeping Entry Points in Education
Whenever official permission, assistance, or other documentation is required in 
schools, gatekeeping opportunities occur and parents may be asked to make informal pay-
ments. According to anecdotal evidence, one-time payments have occurred when parents 
are willing to seek benefits for their children upon the latter’s entering or graduating from 
a school or transferring between grades. This might include bribing a school administrator 
for accepting a child to an elite school or class when entering the school or when changing 
levels from elementary to basic or basic to secondary school. It might also include bribing a 
principal or a teacher to obtain better grades on a transcript. It might be particularly impor-
tant in systems that do not use standardized testing and where school-leaving grades are 
taken into account for admission to universities. 
Recurrent payments from parents can be collected once or more per academic year 
by parents themselves (or children at the secondary school level), teachers, or school princi-
pals. These are much harder to track and the majority of them are not officially required or 
recorded. Payments can be initiated voluntarily by other parents or asked for informally by 
teachers or school principals. In some countries, legislation prohibits parents from making 
payments to schools. In these countries, parental committees are organized and registered 
as independent NGOs collecting donations from parents on behalf of schools or classes. In 
some cases, parent-committee members may pressure other parents to pay for school or 
class needs. 
Payments collected by parents are usually used for school or classroom maintenance. 
These payments may be initiated by teachers or parents themselves. Parental donations may 
be for such services as hiring security guards to increase safety on school grounds. Such 
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In some countries, in the last grade of the secondary school parents may send their chil-
dren to private tutors. The workload of these children is rather large. Parents effectively 
pay schools to accept the grades given by private teachers (OSI ESP/NEPC, 2006). Parents 
or students may also collect money for extracurricular activities, excursions, presents for 
teachers, etc.
Payments that are initiated by teachers are intended for classroom supplies and pres-
ents to the school principal or the school. This also includes payments for private tutoring 
by the teacher who may pressure parents to send their children for additional lessons after 
school. Teachers may also place pressure on parents to augment their teaching salaries. The 
latter two payment types can be considered corrupt.
Principals may need money from parents to give presents to officials from local 
municipalities or to provide benefits for their schools such as an increased school bud-
get, reconstruction, or repairs. School principals may organize special presents for school 
inspectors so that their schools receive more positive official reports. Principals may also 
use parental contributions for private gain. It is not clear who collects payments that serve 
the needs or interests of the principal. 
The transaction flows for informal payments were easily outlined by the research 
team. The resulting model, while not comprehensive, was sufficient to assist in the process 
of formulating questions for all participant countries.
Formulating the Research Questions
PIPES was designed as an exploratory study because so little was empirically known about 
the nature and function of informal payments by parents for education. The research team 
was guided in its deliberations by prior research efforts on educational corruption (Tanaka, 
S. 2001; Eckstein, M. 2003; Heyneman, S. 2004; Hallak, J. & Poisson, M. 2007) as well as 
by previous work on private tutoring (Bray, M. 1999; OSI ESP/NEPC, 2006). 
An earlier NEPC study on private tutoring in Eurasia provided evidence for the devel-
opment of provisional concepts upon which to base the research questions and formulate 
general hypotheses (Bray, M. 1999). Some issues also came out of the pilot study for this 
program. In February, 2006, a seminar was held in Baku, Azerbaijan, to choose five major 
groups of questions.
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Group I. The real, private cost of informal payments for public schooling
The term “real, private cost” is the aggregate sum of expenses that parents and families 
are expected to bear for goods and services necessary or legally required for compulsory 
education. It is the total expense associated with costs to parents for educational goods and 
services that are not officially provided by the state or local government. This first group of 
questions attempted to assess the expense being borne by parents and the average costs for 
specific items or services. 
It is apparent that informal payments exact real costs on private households. This 
group of questions had to be as specific as possible since some costs to parents, such as 
school uniforms, are officially sanctioned, while others, like transportation, are not. The 
questions also needed to allow for a wide variation in responses because of the different 
expenses required in different locations.
Corruption-free Education
The system of education is free of corruption when it ensures equal access to 
education and fair distribution of educational materials, states fair and trans-
parent criteria for selection to schools, maintains professional standards of 
school administrators, teachers, and is accountable to their customers—stu-
dents, parents, and wider public. Accountability relates also to issues of inef-
fectiveness and inefficiency of education systems, and can create a so-called 
“shadow zone” for the corrupt practice. For example, if payments of parents 
to schools is an issue of accountability of schools for the school budgets, do 
parents know how their donations are used and are these payments voluntary 
or demanded from the school administrators?
Source: Brian Heuser, Education Corruption Research Study Paper on PIPES Pilot Project, 
March 2006
 
The research team was aware of funding schemes in which parts of payments were 
passed up the chain of administration to high officials. Since the study focused on parents, 
principals, and teachers, the opportunity existed to check for fund leakage, cost inflation, or 
other additions by posing the same questions to each different group. Additional questions 
were designed to reveal the exertion of pressure on teachers or principals to accommodate 
payment schemes. 
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Also considered were the public perceptions of low teacher salaries for which infor-
mal payments might be understood as compensatory. It was important to find out whether 
teachers spend significantly more time educating students whose parents have made such 
payments and whether the students whose parents do not make such payments still receive 
an adequate education.
Group II. Nature and prevalence of informal payments
To divide this question, separate categories were created to assess both the character and 
frequency of the phenomena. To determine the nature of payments, the form, amount, pur-
pose, and recipients were subjects of different questions. Expectations connected to making 
payments and types of pressure that might be applied were also included in the survey. For 
these questions, a range of persons potentially involved in the process were included in 
the phrasing of both questions and answers to encourage clear responses. Questions about 
teacher salaries, school improvements, vertical payments, etc., were added. 
Questions for this second category sought to examine how often payments were 
requested and made as well as what percentage of parents or households were making them. 
Suggested intervals were single or one-time; yearly; each semester; and more frequently. 
Group III. Root causes
Identifying root causes was difficult. Through earlier research, experience, and anecdotal 
evidence, the team had developed an awareness of the following phenomena:
 Existence of funding schemes in which vertical payments are made to school officials 
and the related possibility of pressure being exerted on teachers/principals to enact 
and/or accommodate such schemes
 Public perceptions of low teacher salaries for which informal payments might be 
understood as a necessary bonus
 Potential need for funds to be raised to make improvements to schools themselves or 
for purchase of supplies teachers might not be able to afford
 Possibility of teachers or administrators seeking personal profit/gain
 Prevalence of the private tutoring market and its role in enhancing student learning 
and achievement
 Possibility that informal payments simply represent an accepted/normative system 
that allows for exploitation without rationale
Since informal payments do not seem to have a single, straightforward cause, these 
possibilities were included in the question. The survey also included an open question to 
allow respondents from all groups to provide their own explanation. 
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Group IV. Quality of primary and secondary education 
Quality of education was another important issue in the survey. Questions designed to 
ascertain the effect on quality focused on issues such as teachers spending more time with 
certain students who had made payments and less time with those who had not made them. 
The survey also tried to determine whether the latter group of students was at a disadvantage 
in terms of learning. Additional questions looked at adults: One question sought to find out 
whether teachers who receive payments see them as entailing obligations. Another asked 
parents whether they thought informal payments threatened the quality of their children’s 
education. How is this sense of threat related to their level of income?
Group V. Possible or perceived remedies
For this final group of questions, the research team decided to test different theoretical and 
practical responses to the problem of informal payments. Potential remedies for policy, 
educational management, and other means were considered. The first two questions in this 
group involved the oft-cited issue of low teacher salaries. The research team agreed to con-
sider the viability of increasing teachers’ pay and whether teachers can earn a living without 
additional income from informal payments. 
Perceptions about remedies by different groups, from parents to high-level officials, 
were inquired into. The survey also checked to see whether parents expressed any desire to 
address this perceived problem. Finally, the team decided to include a question that explored 
whether any remedies had inherent risks, such as that of lowering the quality of education 
or reducing access for at-risk populations. 
Research Design
Between February and April 2006, multiple pilot instruments were developed for this 
research project by the Open Society Institute’s Education Support Program (Budapest), 
the Center for Innovations in Education (Baku), the SIGMA sociological research company 
(Baku), and Dr. Brian Heuser of Vanderbilt University (Nashville). It was agreed that PIPES, 
as an exploratory study, would incorporate mixed research methodologies developed by field-
testing various questions, concepts, and formats. The research design and method followed 
from the need to generate specific datasets. 
The PIPES research team agreed that five datasets would be used to assess infor-
mation gathered from four respondent groups: (i) parents/families, (ii) primary/secondary 
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school teachers, (iii) primary/secondary school principals, and (iv) educational experts at 
varying levels.3 The characteristics of those datasets can be found on www.edupolicy.net. 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has been used in the 
research:
 Statistic data analysis 
 Survey based on a structured interview 
 Focus group discussions 
 Expert survey
Based on the datasets, the questionnaires for parents, teachers, and school principals 
were developed and piloted in Azerbaijan in spring 2006. In September 2006, six new 
countries—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, Latvia, and Slovakia—joined the study 
and participated in reviewing the research instruments (questionnaires and focus group 
questions) for cultural comparability. 
Since the intention behind PIPES was to develop a comparative, cross-national study, 
ensuring the comparability of the core concepts was of primary importance. Issues of lin-
guistic interpretation, conceptual applicability, and cultural sensitivity were scrutinized. 
Research teams from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, Latvia, and 
Slovakia debated the merits of implementing the study in their respective countries. Refine-
ments were made to the classification of both employment and educational categories. Com-
mon formats for data aggregation and coding were also established. 
Beyond the technical issues, however, of central concern to the researchers was (1) 
the ability of the language used in the research instruments to capture the cultural nuances 
associated with informal payments in their differing contexts; (2) the highly sensitive nature 
of the study and the ability of researchers to collect accurate data; and (3) ensuring the use of 
common/synthesized demographic categories for the sake of comparative analyses among 
the countries once the data had been collected. 
The questionnaires and the research questions were developed in English, translated 
into Russian, and provided to teams in each participating country. Each team translated the 
instruments into its respective national language; the wording of the questions was generally 
retained in the translated questionnaires.
To ensure the quality and comparability of the data, several meetings with the research 
teams were held. The meetings covered the development of the research design, adjustment 
of survey instruments, and procedures for sampling, coding, analysis, and reporting. Data 
collection in the other six countries took place from November 2006 to March 2007.
Language posed a significant challenge. Properly labeling the actions and feelings of 
parents and families who were making unregulated payments from their own pockets for 
their children’s schooling was difficult. Applying a label to such payments that suggested 
their illegality was sure to produce an unworkable study. 
The criteria for referring to “informal payments” were intended to ensure that the 
terminology:
 adequately captures the inherent meaning of this kind of payment; 
 can be clearly translated into Russian and other regional languages; 
 does not imply specific social or legal wrongdoing by the respondents or institution; 
 does not invoke culturally sensitive considerations; 
 does not “lead” the respondent to think in one direction or another about the “correct-
ness” of his or her response; and
 does not exclude responses that the research teams may not have considered. 
On Sensitivity
Sensitivity is, then, a complex concept that is easier to recognize than to define. 
It depends on the respondents’ concerns about disclosing any information about 
certain topics, about disclosing information to an interviewer, and about disclosing 
to third parties.
—Tourangeau et al., 2000, pp. 259
In other words, the team tried to use language that balances neutrality and clarity 
with precision. 
During the pilot study, the concept of “informal payments” was field-tested among 
different respondent groups in Azerbaijan. It was found that the use of this language made 
some respondents hesitant. It nonetheless clearly denoted the specific forms of payments 
for which the study was designed.
The researchers noted that the apprehension related to responding was due in large 
part to a perception among Azeri citizens that the giving or receiving of various forms 
of informal payments was either “wrong” or “illegal”; these Azeris feared repercussions— 
either from the government or from persons within the school system, or both—for discuss-
ing or reporting such things. 
Other researchers argued for the use of alternative terms such as “extra-legal,” 
“improper,” and “additional.” There was much discussion about whether “informal” implied 
corruption. In the end, all members of the research team agreed to make neutrality and 
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objectivity a priority. Some participants suggested that in their countries the term “informal 
payments” be replaced by “supplemental payments,” which would be “less offensive” to 
those respondents who might not wish to participate in the study because of the sensitivity 
of the topic. In Slovakia, the concept of “informal payments” was translated as “unofficial 
payments,” which was said to be easier for Slovak participants to understand.
Similar discussions were repeated at the October 2006 meeting in Istanbul, where 
the full group of seven countries gathered to finalize agreements on participation in the 
study. At this meeting, the same considerations were applied to other aspects of the research 
instruments to ensure uniformity among the participants.
High standards for clarity and confidentiality were upheld in each country. In rela-
tion to earlier concerns, field tests and trials found that parents and family members were 
willing to offer direct and honest answers to questions related to informal payments where 
adequate assurances of confidentiality could be given. Research teams made it known that 
they were independent from their respective governments and prepared strict confidential-
ity statements to present to respondents. These actions significantly aided in assuring most 
respondents that their participation in the study would be anonymous. 
Adjustments were allowed in specific cases. For example, in Georgia, interviewers 
were informed as to the importance of confidentiality and provided with instructions on 
how to persuade respondents that their individual responses would not appear in the report. 
Each respondent was shown a letter by the International Institute for Education Policy Plan-
ning and Management to persuade him or her to take part in the survey. Principals of three 
schools refused to participate. They were replaced by those from schools of the same size 
and region. 
The interviewers also had to explain the sampling procedure to respondents to ensure 
that they were randomly sampled and that confidentiality was guaranteed. In Moldova, the 
interviewer also presented a letter stating the purpose of the study, identified the institutions 
involved, and assured participants of confidentiality. As often as necessary the interviewer 
reminded respondents of the confidential nature of the study. In group discussions, no 
other information except first names was disclosed. Those who didn’t want to identify their 
children’s school were not asked to.
Sampling
To determine the groups of respondents, it was recommended that the country teams utilize 
multistage sampling procedures in which stratified random samples were drawn from pub-
lic records. Households were selected first, with primary demographic considerations given 
to (a) grade level of the student in the family, (b) urban/rural geographic location, (c) ethnic/
racial group, and (d) socioeconomic status of family. Schools were to be selected secondly 
from those in which the given students were enrolled. School characteristics considered in 
the sampling included (a) urban/rural geographic location, (b) school typology (which dif-
fered across country groups), (c) total number of enrolled students, and (d) total number of 
full-time teachers employed. The final sample sizes across these respondent groups in each 
country are represented in Table 1.
Table 1. 














Azerbaijan 1,050 1,482,521 1,044 159,303 100 4,543
Georgia 700 597,000 700 66,000 100 2,470
Kazakhstan 785 1,193,000 785 118,000 100 3,221
Latvia 600 266,111 604 26,089 60 983
Moldova 862 527,438 564 40,900 60 1,483
Slovakia 509 702,307 488 56,413 37 3,181
Tajikistan 1,000 1,405,779 1,000 98,500 100 3,724
TOTAL 5,506 6,174,156 5,185 565,205 557 19,605
The specific sampling procedures used in each country are detailed below.
Azerbaijan
Multistage sampling was applied to select households. The country has 4,533 schools, 
including 1,136 (about 35 percent) in cities and 3,397 (about 65 percent) in villages. At the 
first stage of sampling, all schools were classified first by location and then by geography 
(urban or rural), administrative territory, type, and size. The study was carried out in 11 
provincial administrative centers, and 51 villages in Baku, Sumgayit, Mingachevir, Ali-
Bayramli, Khachmaz, Gusar, Lankaran, Agstafa, Shaki, Ujar, and Saatli districts. The surveys 
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were conducted in the form of face-to-face interviews, questionnaires, and focus-group 
discussions.
In sampling parents, interviewers asked for the class registers of grades 3, 5, 7, 9, 
and 11. They selected every third and tenth pupil from each register. They also took addresses 
of the selected pupils from the register. Interviews were conducted at the pupil’s home.
In sampling teachers, interviewers determined the percentage of teachers to be inter-
viewed and selected them from the general list. 
Focus-group discussions, including the number and composition of participants, were 
determined by location and type of settlement. There were 12 face-to-face, structured inter-
views with officials, civil society experts, journalists, and lawyers involved in education.
The Ministry of Education of the Azerbaijan Republic provided support at all stages 
of the surveys. Local executive bodies also provided necessary accommodations for conduct-
ing the survey. Parents and teachers, who acted as school representatives, also participated 
in the survey.
Georgia
There are 2,984 schools in Georgia. Regional distribution was maintained by the survey by 
sampling schools in 10 regions. One hundred schools were surveyed—75 in urban and 25 
in rural areas. 
For the parent interview, a list of students was obtained by school administrations and 
was then used to form a sample. This approach was used to ensure that potential households 
were limited to those with students. It also ensured that only households with students were 
included in the sample. Parents were selected in the following manner:
Interviewers asked for the class registers of five grades:
 In the 3rd grade, they took the address of the 3rd and 4th student in the list.
 In the 5th grade, they took the address of the 5th student in the list.
 In the 7th grade, they took the address of the 6th and 7th student in the list
 In the 9th grade, they took the address of the 8th student in the list.
 In the 11th grade, they took the addresses of the 9th student in the list.
When a parent refused to participate, another respondent in the same class in the 
same school replaced him in accordance with the above procedure. 
The interviewers had to call and arrange meetings. Respondents were representatives 
of the households primarily responsible for the children’s school duties. When the targeted 
respondents were not available, an interviewer would call back at the same household three 
times. The callback was made on a different day or at different time. Each callback visit was 
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recorded. The response rate among parents was high. Seven parents were surveyed from 
each of the selected schools. 
Teachers in the selected schools were randomly chosen. The criteria for selecting 
teachers included their educational background, age, and the grade they teach. Focus-group 
respondents were recruited from the list of the selected schools. Quota and recruitment 
questionnaires were devised for screening respondents. In total, 700 teachers were inter-
viewed, seven in each school. School principals, educational experts, and NGO representa-
tives were interviewed in depth. 
Focus groups were organized for parents. In devising methods for conducting the 
focus groups, the experience of the participants and the nature of specific problems was 
taken into account. Group discussions offered an opportunity for members to express their 
opinions and to raise sensitive issues that could not otherwise be revealed during individual 
interviews.
Kazakhstan
There are 8,575 schools with over three million students in Kazakhstan. At stage one, schools 
were chosen from nine regions. Multistage, stratified random samples were chosen in pro-
portion to the population of each particular region. These included Almaty city, Astana city, 
Shymkent city, Uralsk city, Kokchetau city, Almaty oblast, Akmola oblast, West-Kazakhstan 
oblast, and South-Kazakhstan oblast. Seventy-two urban and 28 rural schools were chosen.
The questionnaire was developed and translated to fit into a Kazakh cultural context. 
The survey was conducted in Kazakh or Russian depending on the respondent. In rural 
areas only Kazakh was used.
To select the parents, interviewers took class registers of the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 
11th grades. The 1st and 5th grade students had been selected previously. Parents of those 
students were interviewed at home. On some occasions, school principals refused to provide 
the address of the chosen pupil, in which case another student was chosen.
Principals, teachers, parents, and experts in education comprised each focus group. 
Four focus groups were conducted in Russian in the large city of Almaty while another two 
were conducted in Kazakh in Otegen Batira village. Nine in-depth interviews with educa-
tional experts and one roundtable discussion were held.
Latvia
The complete list of elementary schools and secondary schools included 983 schools with 
266,111 pupils. The sample was designed in proportion to the number of pupils in six regions 
and the language of instruction (Latvian, Russian, Mixed [both Latvian and Russian]). 
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Sixty schools were selected to participate. If a selected school declined to participate, 
a replacement was made by choosing a similar school in the same area and with the same 
characteristics. 
 The principal, teachers, and parents was selected and surveyed in each school. Within 
each school, the number of surveyed teachers and parents was chosen according to the type 
and size of the school (elementary school, secondary school, or gymnasium). Overall, 4 to 
18 teachers and parents were surveyed within each school.
Teachers of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th grades were surveyed. If there were 
parallel classes at school, two or three 2nd grade teachers were surveyed, two or three teach-
ers of 4th grade were surveyed, etc., until the necessary number of teachers was reached. 
But the necessity of having at least two teachers from each of the aformentioned grades 
participate was determinative. 
Parents of pupils in 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th grades were surveyed. They 
were identified through their child’s number in the register and the total number of pupils 
in a particular class. Within each class, no more than three parents were surveyed. If the 
chosen pupil was not attending school that day, the questionnaire was given to the pupil 
with the next number in the register. 
In the qualitative study, four focus groups and in-depth interviews were organized 
with school representatives, Ministry of Education and Science officials, education experts, 
and parents participating. 
Moldova
There are 1,483 schools and 527,438 pupils in the Republic of Moldova. In 280 schools, 
teaching is in Russian (108,358 pupils). A two-stage random sampling proportional to size 
was used. In the first stage, the geographical distribution of pupils in regions was the cri-
terion. In the second stage, urban and rural distribution within the region proportional to 
the permanent population was calculated. Thus, out of the total sample of 1,483 schools, 
39 percent of the participating schools were from urban areas and 61 percent from rural 
areas. Twenty percent were schools in which Russian is the language of instruction. Finally, 
to ensure universal representation, schools in 2 municipalities, 15 regional centers, and 61 
rural settlements were selected. In municipalities and in regional centers, the schools were 
selected randomly. Thus, 11 schools were selected in the Chisinau municipality, 3 schools in 
the Balti municipality, and 1 school in each regional center. In villages with more than one 
school, the selection was performed in the same way.
Parents, teachers, and principals were selected from the same school. From each class 
register of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th and 12th grades, one student was selected and assigned 
one of three groups. Family addresses of the chosen pupils were found in the school register.
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Teachers were randomly selected from each school in the sample, and in each selected 
school, the principal was interviewed. In some schools, the principal was absent or refused 
to participate in the survey. The total number of principals was 60. 
Seventy-two in-depth interviews with education experts and administrators 
were held. 
Slovakia
The territory of Slovakia was divided into 30 geographical areas, each of which was assigned 
an administrator responsible for conducting face-to-face interviews with selected partici-
pants. The coverage of the survey included both primary and secondary schools in urban 
and rural settlements in the areas. In finding respondents, the administrators had to rely 
mostly on personal contacts in their area. 
The primary source was quantitative data obtained through face-to-face interviews 
with three categories of respondents—teachers (454), parents (513), and principals (37). 
Thirty administrators collected 1,004 questionnaires, covering 320 different schools. To 
enrich the overall picture, additional qualitative data was obtained through three focus-group 
discussions (parental focus groups in Bratislava and Dolný Kubín, secondary school student 
focus groups in Bratislava) and interviews with relevant stakeholders and experts.
Reluctance to answer personal questions about income or illegal conduct was expected. 
Respondents were informed about the confidential nature of the questionnaires and assured 
that no personally identifiable data would be disclosed.
Additional sources of data included qualitative impressions obtained through focus- 
group discussions and interviews with relevant stakeholders and experts. Informal pay-
ments are a highly sensitive matter, a more complex analysis of whose broader causes and 
consequences the focus groups allowed the project to develop. As the participants were not 
a representative sample of the population, no general conclusions can be drawn from the 
discussions, but they did serve to provide extra information about and better insight into 
the quantitative survey.
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, multistage, stratified, territorial, random sampling was used. The survey 
was conducted in 100 schools in five areas of the country (Dushanbe, Gorno Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast, Sugd oblast, Khatlon oblast, and Districts of Republican Jurisdiction) 
in proportion to the number of students in each area. To ensure efficient performance of the 
supervisors’ and interviewers’ work, forms #1–5 were designed to record chosen schools and 
respondents. The forms were filled in by the supervisors and passed on to the interviewers 
for further use. Six supervisors and 30 interviewers were involved in the survey. 
3 6   A N  E X P L O R A T O R Y  S T U D Y
The schools were selected in proportion to the total number of students in each area. 
In urban areas, the ratio of urban and rural schools was 70 percent to 30 percent. Rural and 
urban schools were selected at random from the general list of schools in each area. 
There was one focus-group discussion with parents in each of the four towns. In 
Dushanbe, there were two group discussions with parents and one group discussion with 
high school students. Twelve survey instruments were distributed to authorities in educa-
tion, lawyers, representatives of government commissions on education, journalists, etc. 
Challenges and Limitations
Despite efforts to capture the meaning of private informal payments and communicate it 
clearly across the different countries’ studies, some groups nonetheless reported instances 
of respondent confusion. The terms “supplemental payments in schools” and “supplemental 
contributions” were also met with a degree of uncertainty. The exception was in Azerbaijan, 
where the original language was used. 
While the field researchers were diligent in explaining the concept, some respondents 
found it difficult to provide an accurate accounting of those payments that were “supplemen-
tal” in nature. These responses were noted in both the quantitative and qualitative portions 
of the data and should be considered as challenges to our operational definition of informal 
payments and to the internal validity of data arising from each of the country studies included 
in this research. An adaptation of the definition to include a broader conceptualization of 
payments was permitted after the Azerbaijani pilot study for surveys in the remaining six 
countries.
The surveys administered to parents and families included sections that asked respon-
dents to account for their gross expenditures on different kinds of informal payments, their 
frequency, and the overall percentage of income that such payments constitute. Some men-
tioned that they had difficulty recalling the precise amounts of these payments, and many 
had never calculated them as a percent of total household income or expenditures. Such 
instances were reported frequently enough for us to exercise caution as to the exactitude of 
these numerical values. Again, respondents mentioned these difficulties during both the 
interviewer-administered surveys and focus group sessions. 
To accommodate cultural differences, the research teams in different countries were 
permitted to employ slightly different methods of data gathering for the parents/families 
surveys, though they were required to use the same basic questionnaire. Specifically, some 
groups chose to conduct the surveys as face-to-face interviews in which the researcher posed 
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all questions and recorded all responses. In other cases, the questionnaires were distributed 
as self-administered, confidential surveys. While the interview method ensured that the 
surveys were fully completed and that adequate answers were provided, this method may 
have also substantially increased the likelihood of receiving socially desirable responses. 
But in light of the difficulty some participants had with understanding the concepts related 
to informal payments, focus-group sessions indicated that the interviewer method also pro-
vided critical guidance. 
Finally, school principals across all the country groups expressed a strong reluctance to 
participate in the study. A number of the principals refused for various reasons to respond. 
Some cited their authority not to be subjected to the study, others expressed a general sense 
of fear, a significant number mentioned the sensitive nature of the topics involved, and a few 
argued that neither they nor their teachers had the time to participate. In most cases, it was 
evident to the research teams that these principals were simply trying to avoid participation 
from a sense of the awkwardness of the subject and a fear of sanction. 
As described earlier, measures to ensure confidentiality had already been integrated 
into the methodology. Based on long experience conducting research on socially sensitive 
topics, the research team expected that some respondents might be uncomfortable with 
this one. Also, the problem of reticence was anticipated. For these reasons, the option to 
opt out was left open to respondents, and no replacement respondents were sought. Other 
steps were also taken to ensure the independence of this research and the anonymity of the 
contributions. 
The fact that principals opted out of the survey demonstrated to the research team the 
high level of sensitivity on this issue as well as a low level of openness. As with many other 
issues in the transition process across Eurasia, strong reactions indicate the continued need 
to raise questions about basic issues, particularly those that affect equity and access. 
PIPES was unable to provide specific answers to the many questions that surround 
the phenomenon of informal payments for education. This exploratory study could neither 
assess specific household costs for informal payments, nor funds received by schools, nor 
distinguish how these resources are allocated. The actual implementation of the survey, 
though, provided additional insights. 
As anticipated, the term “informal payments” did create confusion, which helps to 
explain some of the difficulties encountered. More importantly, the conduct of the survey 
interviews and focus-group discussions demonstrated that parents, teachers, and principals 
are not fully aware of the extent of informal payments; nor do they keep close tabs on their 
receipt or use. Accurate accounting of this phenomenon remains elusive. 
As one of the first attempts to look at this phenomenon through the eyes of teachers, 
parents, and principals across a broad region, the study has qualitatively determined the 
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scope of the problem, the motivations for involvement, and the potential impact, with sup-
porting data that helps to outline trends. 
The study indicates that parents across the region may have made yearly education 
payments equal to as much as two-thirds of a monthly household income. This estimation, 
which is based on data from 2006, does not accurately gauge the full financial burden 
on families, especially for poor families and those with more than one child in school. 
It does though begin to show that payments comprise a significant portion of household 
expenses.
Since the time of the survey, the situation does not appear to have improved. In Mol-
dova and Tajikistan, which have the poorest economies, informal payments have increas-
ingly been used to cover gaps in school operational financing. In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, 
where petroleum has brought windfall profits, luxury costs like gifts and extravagant events 
have increased. These two trends indicate the continuing need to track the size and fre-
quency of parental payments. Fortunately, stakeholders are developing the vocabulary nec-
essary to discuss and respond to informal payments. They have also begun to consider the 
need to keep closer track of these payments and to allow discussions and investigations to 
take place. 
Whatever its limitations, this study lays a foundation for future work on the subject 
and makes it clear that succeeding efforts will need to be far-reaching and carefully coordi-
nated to take account of the many issues involved in this complex phenomenon. PIPES is a 
first step. It creates a context for discussion about where to draw the line between legal and 
encouraged payments and illegal and discouraged ones. The remaining chapters offer ways 




For nations undergoing social transformation, gaps, particularly in the provision of public 
services, can easily appear. When funding, regulation, and other structures fail, social insti-
tutions like education are threatened, particularly in terms of school quality, equity, and 
access. The price of transition is difficult to gauge, but phenomena like informal payments 
provide an opportunity to measure the cost. The PIPES study revealed a series of costs to 
parents that can be regarded as informal payments in nations across Eurasia. This chapter 
provides a synthesis of the results. 
As an initial step requiring clarification, the research team identified school-related 
items for which parents might pay. Several sets of items arose. The first were common costs 
for education that might be covered by parents, such as extracurricular activities, lunch, 
clothing, stationery, transportation, and textbooks. Often the responsibility of parents around 
the world, but new for many in post-Soviet countries, these costs rose exponentially as 
their countries turned away from centralized, command economies to open markets. Many 
parents were unprepared to bear these expenses, especially with soaring underemployment 
and unemployment rates. 
Other costs were easier to anticipate, but were still hard to handle. Some expenses one 
might expect with the rise of a shadow economy, like bribes, grade-buying, or gifts. Some 
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parents tried to improve their children’s educational achievement through tutoring or extra 
group lessons. A final grouping of other costs came with the transition, costs that would pay 
for school upkeep, heating, maintenance, and the like. 
When surveyed, parents as well as teachers readily identified most of these costs. 
Where some expressed discontent at having to pay for anything, including transport and 
clothing, nearly all identified costs associated with school repairs, maintenance, and activi-
ties as those that they had expected to be covered by the schools themselves. These items 
topped the list of their major educational expenditures. Respondents in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia noted payments for heating and those in Moldova listed bribes. Respondents from 
all countries included presents and gifts within this list of necessary expenses.
While all of these items can be considered informal payments for education, it is the 
second group that is the primary focus in this review. Very few are documented and most 
are understood as formal costs for education: in the transition, the line between formal and 
informal has been blurred. By looking at the results from the PIPES survey, we can begin 
to measure the real costs of this phenomenon.
In this chapter, an overview of the preliminary findings is given before the in-depth 
review of survey responses. This longer section presents the scope of payments, motivations 
behind payments, and their potential impact on education and society. The chapter closes 
with a short discussion of the implications of this survey.
Preliminary Findings
As an exploratory study, PIPES research compiled the opinions and perspectives of parents, 
teachers, and principals, results which prove to be relevant across the region. PIPES partici-
pants made comments and supplied other data that can be arranged in the following catego-
ries: education finance; school management; household burden; and ethical situations. 
Education Finance
One of the most important findings from this study concerns the state of education finance 
across Eurasia. Respondents from all groups cite insufficient funds as a primary reason for 
informal parental payments. Officials, including principals, however, continue to claim that 
for the most part schools receive the allocated funds from the state budget. The truth must 
therefore be somewhere between these two positions.
These perceptions about insufficient funds are possibly based on widespread short-
ages in the early years of independence that caused parents to begin contributing. Commu-
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nity members also maintain that governments should and can provide a free education for 
all children. Few have an accurate understanding of what is feasible based on the resources 
governments have available. 
Oft-cited increases in national education spending are also misleading. The national 
education budgets in all of these countries are still low compared to other government 
spending. Moreover, a preponderance of state funds are used only to pay salaries and pen-
sions. Without full and public accounting of the costs of education, populations will main-
tain the erroneous belief that governments are able to provide a free education. 
In some of these nations, economic growth has been positive, so the problem is not 
based solely on the lack of funds. In sum, the problem may largely result from the inefficient 
use and management of these resources. Schools do not have enough autonomy in plan-
ning, allocating, and spending. At the same time, a large number of school administrators 
lack appropriate training and experience for financial management.
In order to fulfill their obligations, principals have found that parents are their most 
reliable, convenient, and responsive sources of revenue. Turning to parents is a logical step. 
Unfortunately, the management of the resources principals collect has not been completely 
transparent and has in some cases become discriminatory. 
Many school administrators work in a top-down organizational culture, and as a result 
have tried to make the best of what they have. Through 15 years of hardship, it was easy to 
develop a dependence on parents as a resource. In many schools, capital expenditures and 
upkeep are left to parents rather than to municipalities and other sources of funding.
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Out of the Shadows
While the phenomenon of informal payments is described as a response to lim-
ited school financing, it is not the only way community members have sought 
to make up for shortfalls in education in post-Soviet countries. Private tutoring 
has also risen sharply during the same period. In 2006, a study on this phe-
nomenon was conducted with funding from OSI. The first recommendation 
from this study is similar to the one coming from PIPES.
“[S]tudies refer to private supplementary tutoring as “shadow education” 
(e.g. Stevenson & Baker, 1992; Bray, 1999), highlighting its relationship to 
mainstream education systems. Just as the shadow cast by a sun-dial can 
tell the observer about the passage of time, so the shadow of an education 
system can tell the observer about changes in societies. Unlike most shad-
ows, however, private tutoring is not just a passive entity: it may seriously 
affect even the body which it imitates. Private tutoring has implications for 
the operation of mainstream schooling, causing difficulties for the smooth 
operation of classroom interactions. Further, private tutoring may be both 
a symptom of corruption in societies and an instrument through which 
corruption becomes more deeply entrenched.” (p. 18)
“The first recommendation from this study is that the whole phenomenon 
should be given much more attention—by governments, the media, pro-
fessional associations, and society as a whole. In this respect, to extend the 
metaphor, private tutoring should come out of the shadows and be seen 
more clearly in the light.” (p. 18)
Source: Education in a Hidden Marketplace: Monitoring of Private Tutoring (2006). 
OSI: New York.
It is clear that parental contributions are needed to supplement state funding. Some 
of them should be formalized as expected costs, particularly in the case of mandatory pay-
ments needed to ensure standards in education. Other payments should be made according 
to transparent procedures to prevent shadow or hidden payments. Others, such as payment 
for admission to school, grade buying, oversized gifts, and bribes, should be completely 
outlawed. Appropriate monitoring should also be put in place. 
Despite legislative guarantees to the contrary, most governments are not able to pro-
vide adequate and sustainable funding to ensure free education for all. The study recognizes 
that the main task of the government in this regard is to ensure the financial sustainability 
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of the school system. To do so, governments must correctly estimate the real cost of educa-
tion and to allow parental contributions to become an effective funding mechanism. But 
parents should no longer be sources of additional funding for expenses that should be borne 
by the state. 
The meaning of free education as stipulated in national constitutions and laws on 
education is often fraught with ambiguity and contradiction, especially when compared to 
the expenses actually covered by the state budgets. In Moldova, for example, parents expect 
that all costs, including food and transport, should be provided by the government, although 
this is not a standard expectation in other countries. The majority of funds from the state 
budgets of most of the participant countries cover only staff salaries, leaving other costs 
unaccounted for. 
In the Kazakh case, nearly two-thirds of the principals considered state financing to be 
insufficient and a primary cause for the introduction of parental payments. In their country 
report, the Kazakh research team also wrote that “schools do not have enough autonomy in 
planning, allocating and spending. In order to execute their own priorities, they must search 
for the most reliable, convenient, and fast sources, which happen to be parents of their stu-
dents.” Some principals across the region even state that at any given time they are unsure 
of when state funds would arrive and how they would be permitted to use them. 
Situations like these have led to the assumptions about the lack of state funds for edu-
cation despite the fact that these governments have begun to increase the financial resources 
available for schools. The resulting confusion can best be cleared up by determining which 
aspects of education are to be paid for by the state and which become the responsibility of 
parents.
School Management
The study also considered some functions of school administration. Teachers, parents, and 
principals each differed in their understandings of financial management. For instance, 
parents in Latvia believed that “if the school building needs repairs, then we parents 
all contribute together because the community is very poor but the children still need a 
school.” Despite this position, most principals reported that they received adequate funds 
for their school. It is unknown whether the funds received actually cover all costs incurred 
by the school.
Parents also reported not knowing how funds, especially informal payments, were 
actually used. As the confusion in responses revealed, budgetary processes and accounting 
procedures are not well organized at the school level. Most schools have no means to man-
age the use of financial resources properly. Compliance is generally the domain of the local 
Education and Finance Ministry representatives. Their review tends to focus on state-based 
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funding and implementation, and not on the collection and use of informal payments or 
funding from other sources. State financial audit procedures are designed to review only 
the formal education budget, which means informal budgets arising from parental contribu-
tions or other sources are not controlled.
Payment procedures are ad hoc and not standardized. Few financial records or other 
forms of documentation of parental payments exist. Some payments are misidentified as 
payments for supplemental educational services. Except in some schools, in Kazakhstan and 
Latvia, for example, little public oversight or consultation exists between school management 
and parent associations or independent organizations. It is easy for informal payments to 
go unrecorded and unreported. They may also be misused.
In the few instances where bank accounts and/or autonomous management have 
been allowed, they are relatively new and need development and support. Most parents have 
only begun to learn how to manage complex household budgets in the context of the new 
economy, and few have experience using bank accounts, bank transfers, and similar modern 
financial tools; school management requires training in these areas. Low familiarity with 
personal or institutional financial management is, on the other hand, not consistent across 
the region, and evidence indicates mixed potential for change. 
Participatory planning is not yet in practice, and less than half of the country teams 
reported some form of parent association with legal rights to engage in this activity. More 
often, parents remain unaware of how contributions are actually put to use, although many 
focus-group participants reported that they sought visible changes. Some are unlikely to 
inquire about the real use of their contributions as they believe that their contributions are 
essential and should not be questioned. 
Financial literacy remains a challenge. During the course of focus-group meetings, 
the Latvian research team found only one example of parents who understood the use of 
payments. These parents were not only knowledgeable, but were also engaged in the activi-
ties in a transparent manner. One parent explained:
During the first meeting of the parental association we make a plan of expenses, for 
example, how much we will spend on games and competitions for children, how 
much on the computer lab and so on. Parents vote about the plan. We can also read 
the official minutes from the School Board meeting where the plan for the whole 
school is made. At the end of the school-year, a detailed review of all the budget 
items is performed.
Communities are usually not aware of the opportunities under new legislation or 
cognizant of rules and procedures concerning school finance. Parent associations, boards 
of trustees, and ad hoc groups that serve similar purposes are in various stages of formation 
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across the region. Where legislative rights and responsibilities have been granted, the 
population has not yet learned how to exercise them. 
Nearly all of the country teams reported that education acts do not adequately articu-
late the status, jurisdiction, functions, and protections of these groups. Associations are 
potential avenues for parental and community participation, but they lack independence, 
confidence, and experience. Often relegated to an advisory role, they are even unable to 
monitor the flow of money. 
Some national legislation regarding education financing and management is ambigu-
ous or poorly implemented. For example, in Kazakhstan laws exist that allow schools to have 
access to funds from the state, from community members, and from other sources. Similar 
laws and ambiguity can be found in the majority of these countries. Moreover, when laws 
stipulate that educational institutions may seek additional assets in a prescribed manner, the 
lack of clear and relevant procedures can promote the mismanagement of funds and even 
unlawful or inappropriate demands being placed on parents. 
Alternative mechanisms for attracting resources are underutilized. When laws exist 
to allow the use of donations or other funds, few schools actually pursue these resources. 
When new resources from philanthropy or the community are made available, news of the 
opportunity often fails to reach the localities for whom the resources are meant. 
In some cases, the rate of change along a complex set of variables, like recent reforms 
in Georgia, can be too fast or too complex. This rate and unfamiliarity mean that commu-
nities and schools are unable to process it all at once. Throughout the region, social and 
legal systems to support these changes are either not created or are barely functional. Those 
affected by these changes find it difficult to assume new duties and obligations or have an 
excessive time lag in their adoption of them. 
While many of these observations were raised by expert opinion and focus-group com-
ments in each of the PIPES country studies, the overall survey allowed a look at the process 
surrounding the collection and use of informal payments as a whole. The most common 
purposes are school renovation, maintenance, and other capital improvements. Other pay-
ments include gifts, examination fees, classroom expenses, heating, payments for grades, and 
payments for unknown purposes. Most payments are believed to be mandatory, although this 
is not officially the case. This belief sometimes arises from implied consequences, but more 
often is the result of perceived pressure from community members and school staff.
Household Burden
The study demonstrated that parents are willing to invest in the education of their children 
and that they have a positive attitude toward payments for extracurricular activities, school 
events, trips, and practical school aids. Compulsory parental payments toward mandatory 
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educational services represent the largest share of parental expenditures in education. In 
some cases, parental contributions can match or even exceed the amount of public spend-
ing on education. 
More than 80 percent of all parental payments are formalized and documented and 
cover clothing, shoes, school supplies, meals, transport, and textbooks. More than two-thirds 
of parents contribute to various school events, extracurricular activities, and supplementary 
learning materials. The amount households pay for other purposes ranges from 10 to 15 
percent of the total household expenditures for education. 
As mentioned above, parents make up for budget shortfalls, whether real or perceived, 
with informal payments. Schools and ministry officials rely on their assistance. In combina-
tion with formal expenses they must bear like school supplies or transportation, informal 
payments increase the burden on individual households. Parents in some locations, such as 
Slovakia, pay the equivalent of the official education budget. 
Informal payments in urban schools are larger than in rural schools. In Kazakh-
stan, urban parents pay up to 50 percent more than their rural counterparts, although rural 
households pay a larger percentage of their income. Azerbaijan has a similar distribution of 
informal payments, and costs on families have increased since the time of the survey. For 
example, school-leaving ceremonies, which once had a negligible cost, now can cost up to 
US$100 per student in the capital city. Payments are also more frequently made in cities 
and towns because of the costs of tutoring, school events, and other expenses. Poor families 
tend to contribute less money overall, but these costs constitute a higher percentage of their 
household income. 
In focus-group discussions, parents in most countries expressed a willingness to pay 
even more provided that they can check the purpose of payments and see that their children 
really benefit. The burden currently placed on households is felt not only in terms of the 
value of payments but also in the investment of time, anxiety, and energy. 
Nearly all parents believe that informal payments are necessary and even required, 
although they may not be officially mandatory. As one Tajik parent put it, “If I do not give 
money, then the teacher will leave [the school].” In Azerbaijan, parents simply say, “I must 
pay.” Similar sentiments have been expressed across the region. 
Principals, teachers, and others press parents into contributing, though usually indi-
rectly. One teacher was reported as welcoming her students to a new school year by saying, 
“You see that the school administration has begun some renovation, and there is still a need 
for construction materials. It would be good to get a match from your parents’ side. Our 
school would be best if we help each other.”
Parents are motivated by a desire to improve the quality of the school, both in terms 
of instruction and facilities. Some are motivated by the opportunity to improve their child’s 
standing in the school. Others find that payments help bypass merit-based achievement. 
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Parents may consider the purchase of supplemental learning materials as wasted 
funds since they are rarely used in lessons. They are distrustful of payments connected 
with commercial activities, such as the marketing of services or goods not directly linked 
to the curriculum inside the school by outside dealers of books, atlases, and other goods. 
Even when they consider it unfair, however, most parents still make the requested 
payment.
The majority make informal payments on a monthly basis. Payments of this type by 
household are small, but add up to significant amounts for whole schools. Almost all par-
ents make a cash contribution once or twice a year through parental associations. Total cash 
payments equal about 12 percent of state financing whereas the equivalent of another 20 
percent is in the form of gifts and in-kind contributions. Together these parental payments 
provide schools with more than half the funding provided by the state. 
Ethical Situations
Informal payments not only pose financial burdens. The ambiguities, gaps, and awkward 
relationships involved in this practice present a number of ethical problems, including the 
potential for corruption. As reported in the survey, payments tend to be collected by teachers. 
In focus groups in most of the countries, parents commented that children often serve as 
intermediaries in the collection process. Focus-group participants also indicated that many 
informal payments go undocumented, are publicly unacknowledged, or are thought not to 
be used for their ostensible purpose. 
Compulsory payments adversely affect low-income families and may lead to discrimi-
natory practices in the classroom and administrative offices. About 12 percent of families 
said that students from low-income families were at a disadvantage because their parents 
could not afford school services. Regional differences were also seen in relation to this 
question, with twice as many parents in urban settings indicating adverse effects than their 
counterparts in capital cities.4 
Sometimes payments are used for inappropriate ends. While over 20 percent of 
parents in Moldova have attempted to secure better marks for their children through the 
use of bribes, a much higher proportion of parents have paid for other educational goods 
and services—nearly US$42 million for school supplies and US$10.5 million for private 
tutoring. Presents worth more than US$2 million have been given as gifts to teachers and 
sometimes to principals. During focus-group discussions in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, par-
ticipants noted that the value of personal presents far exceeds what was previously accepted 
as a token of appreciation. 
Gift-giving and private tutoring have both become widely accepted and fairly noncon-
troversial practices. Parents from Georgia comment that parental payments can resemble 
4 8   M E A S U R I N G  T H E  C O S T
mandatory taxes more than voluntary contributions. Students who do not pay may be black-
listed. As one parent explains: 
Collecting money by schools has been declared illegal, though this money is still 
collected for different purposes under the name of contributions. In fact, the 
unlawfulness has been legalized. I believe the money I give my child to pay for a 
cleaning service is not a contribution but a fee I pay monthly.
The survey showed that pressure to make or take payments is felt by every party. 
Experts and school personnel who were focus-group participants said that they needed to 
ask for payments even when they felt uncomfortable doing so. Parents reported pressure to 
make additional financial contributions for the operation and sustainability of their schools. 
In Latvia they commented that they regularly contribute small amounts so that classrooms 
have money for toilet paper or even water. 
Payments also affect relationships. In Azerbaijan, a teacher refused to take on a lead-
ership role in order to avoid the responsibility for collecting payments. She said that it was 
more important to maintain her professional status and to be able to motivate students 
positively. A student in Tajikistan expressed his embarrassment for his teacher when she 
was put in the position of asking children for money. 
Some payments are made with the hope of a tangible outcome, like repairing class-
room windows or receiving better instruction. Others are made to seek favor. For example, 
gifts do not have a direct connection to a goal or timeline. Most often they are tied to build-
ing and maintaining good relationships with teachers as well as other parents of children 
in that classroom or school.
Administrators seem to avoid transparency in parental contributions and other budget 
resources, and parents are hesitant to demand it. Focus-group discussions suggest that most 
parents are reluctant to openly challenge the practice of informal payments lest they create 
a problem for their children. Few parents, according to focus-group discussions, admit to 
directly addressing this issue with the school. Kazakhstan and Slovakia both have separate 
state agencies with regulatory and compliance responsibility, but parents tend not to submit 
complaints. Some, however, seek other avenues, such as complaining through the media 
and neighbors, but these rarely lead to action.
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Survey Responses
Each of the seven research teams prepared a detailed report on the study and its implications 
for their country.5 Their results were tabulated and synthesized into a summary overview 
and are presented in this section by considering three aspects of these payments—scope, 
motivation, and impact. The survey questionnaires can be found on www.edupolicy.net. 
Each time a question is referenced in this report, a simple coding system has been used. It 
comprises a letter signifying the group (P for Parents, T for Teachers, and S for Principals/
Staff) and a number for the relevant question on the questionnaire. 
Scope
The first aspect is the scope of payments. By this term, we intend to demonstrate the form 
and extent of the payments. We discuss the purposes for which they are received, the cost they 
exact on individual households, and the process by which they are received by schools. 
Reasons for payments were the researchers’ initial interest. Parents responded that 
they made payments for a number of items, ranging from shoes to boiler systems. The 
majority of the payments that they make go toward items necessary for their children to 
attend school, such as lunch-packs, stationery, textbooks (purchased and rented), transporta-
tion, and clothing. The majority of parents agreed that these expenses were their responsibil-
ity. Tutoring and extra group lessons were also acceptable costs, unlike bribes for grades and 
diplomas or preferential treatment.
They thought that the responsibility for other items should lie with the school itself 
or be provided through other official channels. This list included repairs, heating, main-
tenance, upkeep, classroom supplies, salaries, and capital expenses. Shared items could 
include school events and extracurricular activities, particularly for students from disadvan-
taged families. 
Limited family budgets were one of the reasons that families had difficulty making 
up for what they saw as governmental budgetary shortfalls. The parents in this study had an 
average monthly household income of US$454. Latvia and Slovakia had the largest incomes 
at over US$1,000 a month, whereas Azerbaijan and Tajikistan had the lowest at around 
US$100 a month (P16). 
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Figure 1.
Payment Frequency
Over the course of the year, families in this study admitted to spending on average 
US$350 on education expenses, for both regular and occasional costs.6 In most countries, 
this total expense over a school year was equivalent to two-thirds of a monthly household 
income. In Georgia and Moldova, the annual household expense was nearly twice this 
amount (P17). In a separate question, respondents estimate that the typical family spends 
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Frequency of payments was also included in the survey. Payments do not seem to be 
sought very often. About a third of the parents said that they were expected or required to 
make payments on a monthly basis. Nearly a quarter said they also made annual payments. 
Few made payments each week (P20). 
Teachers reported that about 30 percent of all payments were one-time collections 
and 11.5 percent were recurring payments (T12, T13). In Slovakia, 44 percent are single-
occurrence payments while in Latvia such payments are thought to comprise as much as 55 
percent of all payments. Teachers in Tajikistan say that single-occurrence payments are the 
most frequent form.
Two-thirds of the teachers said that the typical teacher is never expected by their 
administrators to collect informal payments. Nearly 20 percent did say that an expectation 
to collect arose monthly. Less than 20 percent of teachers said that an expectation to collect 
arose monthly. Slightly more said that such a requirement came on an annual basis. While 
responses about collection frequency varied from country to country, 1 percent or fewer 
expressed a weekly expectation for payments. Ninety-two percent of the Georgian teachers 
said they were never expected to collect any money. In Tajikistan, 61 percent said that they 
were expected to make monthly collections (T11). 
From their total education expenses, parents gave an average of 17 percent in the form 
of informal payments, an amount that ranged from a high of 27 percent in Kazakhstan to 
a low of 6.9 percent in Georgia (P18). More specifically, the parents spent about US$7 per 
child each month in informal payments (P19). However, teachers said that they collected 
about US$1.5 each month per child and a total of less than US$12 a month (T16, T07). 
Understanding where the money goes is an important part of this puzzle. Teachers 
said that they pass on to principals only about 12 percent of the amount that they receive. 
Kazakh teachers said they passed on almost 25 percent and Slovak teachers transferred about 
21 percent. In Moldova, less than 2 percent was given to principals (T08). 
Nineteen percent of the parents believe that the money they give to teachers actually 
goes to the principal (P29). Many more Moldovan parents believed this to be true (56.9 
percent) than Georgian parents (2.5 percent). Only an average of 5.4 percent of teachers 
and 3.4 percent of principals believed that some of the money given to teachers reaches 
the principal (T24, S20). The highest degree of agreement on this issue between these two 
groups was found in Tajikistan (12 percent each), where parents believed that 25 percent is 
passed forward.
Principals estimated that they pass on to other officials less than 5 percent of the 
amount that they collect (S09). They also say that they directly collect less than US$1 per 
student each month (S14). Principals said that schools receive an average of more than 
US$2,000 each year in parental contributions. Kazakh principals reported the highest aver-
5 2   M E A S U R I N G  T H E  C O S T
age annual amount at nearly US$4,000 while Latvian principals said their schools received 
an average of less than US$500 (S08).
It is apparent that a lot of money is collected and changes hands during the school 
year. Since most of it is not properly recorded and not openly discussed, it is very difficult to 
account for the full value of parental payments. It is also possible that parents do not account 
for all of the payments they make. They do, though, remember the general purposes for 
which they make contributions.
A quarter of the money collected by teachers goes to their classes and classroom sup-
plies, except in Georgia where only about 10 percent is for this purpose (T09). Approximately 
35 percent on average goes to the school for improvements or events. Sometimes it is much 
more. Kazakh teachers reported that almost 60 percent goes for this purpose, whereas Slo-
vak principals put the corresponding figure at 85 percent (T10, S10). 
Parental contributions as gifts or in-kind contributions that were received by teachers 
constituted an average of only 6.9 percent of all payments received (T14). Principals said 
in-kind contributions were only 7.5 percent (S11). In comparison, teachers said about 40 per-
cent of contributions came in as cash; principals said it was about 30 percent (T15, S12).7 
Figure 2.
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Despite claims about the need to supplement school finances with informal pay-
ments, the majority of all three groups (65 percent of parents, 73 percent of teachers, and 
70 percent of principals) disagreed that parental contributions were an important source 
of income for their school (P21, T17, S07). All three groups were nearly evenly split on this 
issue in Tajikistan and Moldova. In Azerbaijan no member of any group agreed with this 
statement.
Furthermore, most principals (61.1 percent) believe that it is not necessary for schools 
to collect payments. This sentiment was very strong in Slovakia, with 83.8 percent of them 
disagreeing with the need to collect. In Tajikistan, by contrast, 69 percent of principals 
agreed that the collected payments are necessary (S16). 
In general, most principals said that their school receives the funds allocated to it 
by the state budget. Azerbaijan presented the most difficult situation, where 21 percent 
reported that schools never receive all of the allocated funds. Another 38 percent said that 
they receive them only sometimes. Latvia and Georgia reported the most regular receipt of 
state funds (S35). 
Despite a wide mix of opinions and various inconsistencies, the survey revealed that 
the scope of parental payments for education across Eurasia is not small. Not only is this a 
widespread phenomenon, the general familiarity with the topic demonstrated that informal 
payments have become part of ordinary life. 
The study also revealed that most people have a very limited view of the system of 
education finance. They also differed on how and why payments are collected, a variance 
which might be explained by limited information, pride, or even confusion. The survey 
demonstrated that a more sophisticated research tool and clearer definitions are required to 
better measure this phenomenon.
Motivation
With its wide scope, the study also approached the question of why payments are made. 
Examining why people participate in the informal payments process is essential to under-
standing the phenomenon. In the survey, all three groups were asked about the reasons pay-
ments were made, expectations surrounding these payments, and other influential factors, 
including pressure from individuals. The major question is why parents make payments. 
Rather than assume that payments were always made for a specific purpose, inter-
viewers asked participants to explain the rationale for informal payments in general. The 
answers provided by this large a group of respondents were wide and varied. Some named 
general and abstract issues, like the transition or hard economic times. Others focused on 
specific issues, such as low salaries or the poor material condition of schools. A few used 
the chance to express discontent or to apportion blame.
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Causes for Payments
Respondents in Azerbaijan provided answers that fell into the following six 
categories. They are listed with a sample of specific issues that were provided 
by an open question on causes for informal payments.
  Faulty Education Finance
  — Insufficient budget
  — Noneffective distribution 
  Government Abandonment
  — Government apathy
  — Lack of control
  Submissive Stakeholders
  — Follow circumstances
  — Accept as a norm
  Corruption Compliance
  — Go around broken system
  — Pressure from outside
  Weak School Management
  — Centralized, top-down system
  — Lack of autonomy and experience
  Declining Value of Education
  — Social indifference
  — Social injustice 
The majority focused on the theme of finance and management. Finances were named 
by 64.5 percent of the respondents in Kazakhstan, 66 percent in Azerbaijan, and 66 percent 
in Slovakia. In Georgia and Latvia, finances were mentioned by a lower percentage (35 per-
cent and 25 percent respectively), but still maintained a high ranking as a primary cause. 
More than half of all parents responded that they give informal payments primarily 
so that their children receive better classroom instruction (P42). Only a third of the teach-
ers believed that this was the main reason (T36). Nearly half the teachers said that parents 
expect better instruction in return for payments, especially in Tajikistan (69.9 percent) and 
Azerbaijan (66.6 percent). A higher number said this was an occasional expectation rather 
than a regular one (T26). A similar number of principals agreed (S23).
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Teachers and principals are not the only ones who collect payments and therefore 
exert influence. Sixty percent of the parents believe that parent associations expect payments 
to improve the quality of schools. However, more than three-quarters of Kazakh parents and 
two-thirds of Georgian parents said associations never expect payments primarily for this 
reason (P41). 
Correction of other problems that affected the education experience was another moti-
vation for parents. That teaching salaries are inadequate is a strongly held view of parents, 
particularly in Georgia (80.8 percent) and Latvia (71.3 percent). An overall average of 55 
percent believed this to be the case (P28). 
Nearly all the teachers (87.8 percent) and principals (90.6 percent) disagreed with a 
claim that teachers cannot make an adequate salary without taking parental contributions 
(T23, S33). Nearly 9 percent of principals thought teachers often asked for payments from 
parents to increase their—the teachers’—incomes (S37). A third of all teachers addition-
ally reported that parents give payments primarily for private tutoring (T35), an interesting 
claim since tutoring one’s own students outside of class was almost unheard of during the 
Soviet period. 
Two-thirds of the parents said that the schools expect them to make payments for 
supplies and improvements (P44). A little more than half the teachers and principals made 
a similar statement (T38, S36). In all three groups, the consensus was that payments for this 
purpose were made sometimes rather than often or always. In Georgia, though, the majority 
in each of the three groups said that this was never the primary reason.
About a third of the parents said schools expected their contributions in exchange 
for better grades (P43). Nearly half the parents in Moldova (51.9 percent) and Slovakia (53.2 
percent) thought this was true. Most parents in Kazakhstan (89.4 percent) and Georgia 
(85.0 percent) thought this was never true. Less than an eighth of teachers and even fewer 
principals said that parents actually expected better grades for payment (T27, S24). 
Some answers revealed the respondents’ anticipation of individual and institutional 
pressure. Respondents were asked about the role that such pressure plays in making or 
asking for payments. Informal payments seem to be freely given. In fact, nearly 70 percent 
of parents reported that they give contributions voluntarily. The majority qualified this 
answer by choosing “sometimes” as the frequency. Two-thirds of Georgian parents reported 
that they never give them voluntarily, while only about 15 percent of Tajik parents said the 
same (P40). 
Determining whether informal payments are mandatory or voluntary is important. 
More than half of the teachers said that parents voluntarily give contributions, but mostly 
on an occasional basis. The majority of Georgian teachers (83.6 percent) said parents never 
give them voluntarily, whereas a third of Slovak teachers and a quarter of their counterparts 
in Latvia and Tajikistan said parents always give them voluntarily (T34).
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Almost 80 percent of parents disagreed with the statement that “teachers often pres-
sure parents to give money for school-related activities.” The highest level of support was 
in Moldova with more than half of the parents in agreement (P24). Less than 10 percent 
of the teachers said that they are encouraged by school officials to ask for money for this 
purpose, except in Tajikistan where 15 percent said this was true (T19). Under 5 percent of 
the principals said that this was true (S19).
Few parents (13.7 percent) agreed that teachers often pressure parents for payments 
to supplement their incomes, except in Moldova where the majority (68.2 percent) reported 
payments under such pressure (P25). The vast majority of teachers disagreed that they often 
ask parents for contributions for this purpose. In Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, about 9 percent 
thought this was true, but less than 2 percent in the remaining countries agreed (T20).
Principals (89.0 percent) and parents (80.6 percent) both believed that parents do 
not pressure other parents into making payments. Only in Moldova did the majority of 
parents (53.5 percent) feel that this was true. Principals there also showed more support 
than their counterparts for this statement (20.3 percent), but not at the same level as parents 
(S31, P27). 
An average of 40 percent of the principals stated that parent associations had an 
important role in encouraging contributions. While only a quarter of the principals in Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan said that this was true, many more in Slovakia (64.9 percent) 
and Azerbaijan (59.0 percent) found this to be the case (S32).
In regards to pressure on teachers by principals to collect payments, 19.5 percent of 
parents and 5.7 percent of teachers believed this to be true. Moldovan parents held this view 
in the greatest proportion, 53.2 percent (P26, T21). Very few principals (5.7 percent) believed 
that they were encouraged by other officials to collect contributions (S21). 
Few teachers (4.8 percent) reported parental pressure to accept contributions. 
The highest incidence at around 12 percent was found in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (T22). 
Nearly half of the teachers believed that parents expect better instruction when payments 
have been made. Two-thirds of teachers in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan thought this to be the 
case (T26).
About 10 percent of the principals reported parental pressure to admit children to 
school (S17). A similar number in Azerbaijan reported attempts by parents to provide gifts 
in exchange for student admission, but on average only 8 percent mentioned that this had 
occurred (S13). A little more than 5 percent were reported as often offering contributions 
for this purpose (S18).
Few parents said that teachers expected parental contributions to supplement their 
salaries. While a cross-country average of 73.4 percent of parents felt this was never true, 
almost 40 percent of those in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Tajikistan felt that this was true 
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(P45). In response to a similar question, the great majority of teachers (89.1 percent) thought 
this was never the case, particularly in Kazakhstan, Slovakia, and Georgia. One-fifth of the 
teachers in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan thought this was true some of the time (T39). Most 
principals (90.7 percent) agreed that teachers never ask for contributions for this purpose, 
although 20 percent in Azerbaijan thought this to be sometimes true (S37).
Figure 3.
Who has power?
In any process, the description of power relationships can say a lot about equity and 
access. Each group was queried about whether parents, teachers or principals had much 
power in the contribution process (P33-35, T31-32, S27-29). All of the groups stated that 
parents were powerful (P-36.9 percent, T-38.2 percent, P-44.9 percent), but the respon-
dents tended to give lower ratings for teachers and principals. On average, teachers rated 
themselves as a group as less powerful than principals and half as powerful as parents. 
Principals rated their own group as much lower (16.2%) than teachers (36.1 percent) and 
parents (44.9 percent).
Some of the countries reported interesting differences. For example, parents in Azer-
baijan, Moldova, and Slovakia all gave lower assessments of parents’ power than of prin-
cipals’. Azerbaijani principals and parents ranked teachers above parents. Kazakh parents 
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(15.6 percent), as did Kazakh teachers. Kazakh principals ranked parents high (49.5 percent) 
and themselves very low (5.0 percent). The highest ranking was given to Tajik parents by 
Tajik principals (68.0 percent). Georgians tended to rank the influence of each group under 
25 percent. 
The results suggest that while different groups perceive and sometimes receive pres-
sure to make or receive informal payments, involvement generally comes from a desire to 
provide the best possible education environment. These findings demonstrate that parents 
have willingly assumed a surrogate role in school finance. It remains for us to discuss the 
impact of these payments on their children’s education.
Impact
The impact of this phenomenon was looked into in order to understand how informal 
payments affect educational quality, accessibility, and equity. Parents, teachers, and princi-
pals were asked about their impressions of various types of impact. The results were fairly 
consistent, with the few exceptions discussed below.
Since the quality of education was frequently cited as a motive to make informal pay-
ments, one of the impact questions considered the issue. The respondents informed the 
survey teams that quality was not under tremendous threat. Only 22 percent of parents, 
along with 12.4 percent of teachers and 13.4 percent of principals, believe it is impossible for 
a student to get a quality education unless contributions are made (P31, T28, S25). 
Quality can be assessed in other ways, such as by measuring the level of attention paid 
to students by educators. Around 20 percent of parents believe that teachers spend more 
time teaching students whose parents have made large contributions. This belief is relatively 
common in Azerbaijan (38.7 percent), Moldova (48.6 percent), and Tajikistan (29.3 percent), 
but is held by less than 4 percent of parents in Kazakhstan (P30). About 5 percent of teachers 
and 3 percent of principals thought this was true (T25, S22).
Whether contributions are necessary for higher educational attainment was also 
asked. Most parents (80.7 percent) thought this was never or rarely the case. In Tajikistan 
(37.3 percent) and Moldova (29.6 percent), this was often or always perceived to be the 
case (P46). Similarly low numbers of teachers (12.9 percent) and principals (14.2 percent) 
thought that contributions are needed for success. Both groups in Tajikistan had the high-
est level of agreement (T-39.8 percent, S-40.0 percent) to this statement compared to their 
counterparts in other countries. 
Another issue the respondents considered was that of equity. To what degree do 
requirements to make payments limit access to education? Approximately a third of the 
parents thought that students from poor families are at a disadvantage because their parents 
cannot afford to make supplemental payments. Nearly half of the parents in Azerbaijan and 
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Moldova thought this was true. Kazakhstan had the least agreement at 11.9 percent (P32).8 
Teachers (83.2 percent) and principals (88.5 percent) generally disagreed with this idea. 
These groups in Azerbaijan (T-37.1 percent, S-20 percent) and Tajikistan (T-29.9 percent 
and S-22 percent) registered a higher rate of agreement with the statement than their peers 
in other countries (T29, S26). 
The respondents thought that the largest impact was on the process of education. 
Almost half of all parents agreed that parental contributions hinder or compromise the 
educational process. A little more than a third of the teachers and principals shared this 
sentiment. Azerbaijan had the highest level of agreement (P-88. percent, T-76.1 percent, 
S-63 percent) across the groups (P39, T33, S34); Georgia, the lowest (P-22.2 percent, T-14.7 
percent, S-23 percent).
Despite this impression, parents still demonstrated confidence in the education sys-
tem. Parents expressed a high degree of trust in teachers’ decision making (77.5 percent), in 
the honesty and fairness of principals (77 percent), and in the idea that their children will 
receive a good education whether or not they themselves make contributions (75.4 percent). 
Less than 20 percent of Moldovans expressed trust in all three aspects.
The true impact of informal payments is only partially revealed in the answers to sur-
vey questions. It is difficult to gauge the accuracy of opinions expressed across the region. 
What is apparent from these answers is that the populations of Moldova, Tajikistan, and 
Azerbaijan believe more strongly that informal payments in various forms have a negative 
impact on education. A closer investigation based on data from focus groups, target inter-
views, and other sources allows us to draw general conclusions and to explore the implica-
tions of these findings. 
Implications
It is important to note that the results of this exploratory study are based on respondents’ 
answers. A more thorough look at the phenomenon of informal payments in education is 
provided in the next chapter. It is already evident from this survey chapter, however, that 
informal payments exact a heavy cost on populations in which the practice is widespread. 
The results have been presented above in three categories: scope, motivation, and 
impact. For policymakers, educators, and other practitioners, the critical implications are 
presented here as a summary of the survey results. 
The first is the broad scope of informal payments. All three groups of participants 
(teachers, principals, parents) admit to the existence of informal payments, even though 
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they might disagree with what the term “informal payment” precisely means. Whatever 
the definition used, the prevalence of these payments indicates that parents are ready and 
willing to help schools. 
Half of the surveyed parents are certain that schools cannot exist without parental 
contributions. Yet even more believe that these payments have a negative influence on the 
education process. Mixed numbers also comment on the threat the practice of informal pay-
ments poses to access to quality education, especially for children from vulnerable families. 
Though informal payments do not seem to pose a threat to the quality of education, they 
negatively affect family budgets, especially in low-income families. This system of payments 
also produces awkward relationships that put children in the middle, strain the professional-
ism of educators, and cause parents to struggle to maintain good relations with educational 
institutions. 
Informal payments have multiple implications for school children. These payments 
can marginalize children or place them in difficult positions. Focus-group discussions also 
revealed cases in which children suffered as a result of a parental inability to pay. Some par-
ents claimed to have made informal payments and presents in the hopes that their children 
might be enrolled in a prestigious school or receive more attention. 
The common acceptance of informal payments across the region has an additional 
consequence, particularly in regards to payments that could be considered improper. The 
survey showed that elementary school pupils had difficulty dealing with constant require-
ments to bring money, but by the end of middle school children found this practice to be 
ordinary. This habituation suggests that youth across Eurasia are being socialized into prac-
tices that could be corrupt or illegal. More importantly, they are not learning the values of 
merit-based promotion or clear accountability. 
The unstable financial situation of schools is problematic, especially when we con-
sider the rapid development of a knowledge-based economy and the increased demand for 
high-quality education services. Governments need to ensure that funding reaches schools 
and that resources are properly managed. They must determine in consultation with local 
communities what happens to most parental payments and how to account for them. It 
is essential to involve parents and other community members in this process so that new 
forms of hidden payments do not arise.
The survey revealed a continued need to monitor payments and to conduct public 
advocacy efforts. The variety of answers within and among surveyed groups indicates a lack 
of consensus in the system with regards to the extent and role of parental contributions and 
demonstrates a lack of public knowledge concerning the issue. This gap makes it more dif-
ficult to formulate policy options that will please all parties. 
Appropriate channels for advocacy must be created in order to allow stakeholders to 
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to work together. The needs of groups at the local level must receive the attention of those 
at the provincial and national levels, particularly the decision makers and gatekeepers who 
control education funding and relevant issues. If recent policy reforms are to be effective, 
they must include measures to curb corruption and promote equal access.
While this study only begins to unravel the complexities of informal payments in Eur-
asia, it is clear that chronic public underfunding has caused families and schools to regard 
these payments as necessary. Given that these shortages are unlikely to go away anytime 
soon, it is important to create mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency. This 
effort should begin with the creation of accounting procedures to document and report all 
funds received by schools. This can help schools develop its students’ civic capacities and 
skills.
Advocacy and accountability can lead to a new school culture that creates new relation-
ships, a shared ideology, and fewer hierarchical structures of authority. Such changes may 
initiate a decrease in the prevalence of informal payments and ensure that education is free 
for all. Before exploring these issues in closer detail, the next chapter discusses cases from 
each of the countries that participated in this study to examine the context within which the 




From Myth to Reality
This study is one of the first major attempts to try to measure informal education payments 
and to compare families’, teachers’ and administrators’ experience of them. The findings 
reveal a widespread acceptance of payments as a phenomenon, but also challenge a general 
belief rooted in the region’s educational heritage that the state can provide free education 
in all regards. This chapter explores the reality behind this myth, analyzing the results from 
each of the countries that participated in PIPES. Research in each was conducted by a team 
in the Network Educational Policy Centers, whose membership includes educators in more 
than 20 Eurasian nations. 
All these nations constitutionally guarantee their citizens a free education, and each 
of the PIPES country reports noted an apparent failure to deliver on this obligation. The 
promise of a free education in these new states reflects an expectation inherited from their 
shared Soviet past. Understanding the basis for this perceived obligation is crucial to under-
standing the states’ transition. 
For populations in large parts of the world, “free education” does not mean that families 
do not have to rent textbooks, pay tuition, or send their children to schools that accept dona-
tions. Many understand these payments as private and not public obligations. Their experience 
with education as an investment is not like that of parents and educators across Eurasia.
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The parents in this study grew up at the height of the Soviet educational system. The 
Soviets had a strong, interconnected education system; each decade saw improvements and 
new opportunities. No ordinary citizen had to worry about education. The populations had 
high literacy rates, and schooling was linked to economic development and industrialization. 
In other words, it prepared people for employment and then employed them.
Funding for schools did not come directly from the population. The state covered 
costs using funds from the central budget. The wages any person received also came from 
the state budget. As a result, the population had no experience with many expenses for edu-
cation. Nor were they familiar with taxation, fees, or other major costs. The few purchases 
parents made—clothes, copybooks, lunches, transportation—were heavily subsidized by the 
state. The selection was limited, but supply was sufficient for most to get what they needed. 
Families with more than one child often re-used items and had a clear understanding of 
their responsibilities.
Today’s parents are not familiar with their responsibilities. Nor are their governments 
experienced at fulfilling the obligations that come with free education. Both came from an era 
of the myth of free education. They have a long history of being passive beneficiaries without 
direct and deliberate input. They are now becoming acquainted with the new responsibilities 
of taxation, budgeting, and other resource allocation. The phenomenon of parental payments 
and appearance of other new expenses is teaching them to step out of myth into reality. They 
are learning to redefine “free.” 
Up until the end of the millennium, most parents in this region would not have con-
sidered paying for education. This is not to say that they opposed it but that their encounter 
with education was often managed from outside, that their involvement with it was passive. 
But now they have become active and are making contributions to schools.
Informal payments in Eurasia seem at first glance to be a stopgap measure. In fact, 
their role in the system is fundamental. The myth of free education promises equitable and 
accessible schooling. The experience of the past 15 years has demonstrated that education 
comes with many costs. Learning what these costs are and taking responsible action to meet 
them is central to any education reform. Open discussion of the practice of informal pay-
ments provides an opportunity for change.
Since the education transition in each country begins from a similar starting point, 
this chapter explores the promise of free education through the concept of informal pay-
ments. Education remains a public good and central to government’s social contract with its 
population. As such, education must be reconsidered as a good to be managed and invested 
in by the community. 
In this chapter, we share relevant cases from each of the participant countries while 
we examine the intricacies of parental payments. We take a look at the population’s perspec-
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tive on, involvement with, and expectations of informal payments. By presenting the coun-
try-based cases, we highlight particular and common aspects of the phenomenon for the 
region. This chapter also elaborates issues relevant to the transition in education, especially 
in regard to performance, quality, and accountability. These cases taken as a whole provide 
an overview of parental informal payments for education.
The Context of Transition
Our review of country cases begins with Moldova. This small republic, sandwiched between 
Ukraine and Romania, has been selected to highlight aspects common to the transition of all 
the former Soviet bloc states. Moldova serves as a good example because it has encountered 
nearly all the challenges faced by its counterparts through the period of transition, from 

















Azerbaijan 8.2 50.8 24.6 52 90.6 –1.9 56.4
Georgia 4.6 45.5 16.4 53 71 –4.7 16.8
Kazakhstan 15.3 51.7 22.1 58 53.4 –3.3 26.6
Latvia 2.2 53.7 13.4 68 57.7 –2.3 9
Moldova 4.3 52.3 16.3 42 78.2 –1.1 13.5
Slovakia 5.5 51.5 16.1 56 85.8 0.3 7
Tajikistan 7.2 50.3 34.6 26 79.9 –1.31 42.3
The population of Moldova is only about 4.3 million people, one of the smallest in the 
survey. Kazakhstan, the largest, has three and a half times the population, while Latvia’s is 
only half as large. Moldova, along with Tajikistan, has the largest rural population. All the 
countries have a high concentration of their populations living in the capital. 
Moldova has one of the highest percentages of female population, but one of the 
lowest populations under the age of 15. It also has an aging population, unlike Tajikistan, 
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Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, which have rather young populations. Like all the other coun-
tries except Slovakia, Moldova has a negative migration rate. 
The rise of self-determination across small ethnic groupings or autonomous territories 
has occurred across Eurasia after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. So have border conflicts 
due to multiple border changes and reconfigurations over the last century. For example, Mol-
dova was part of Romania between the world wars but was integrated into the Soviet Union 
after World War II. Within the country on the eastern shore of the Dniester River and along 
the border with Ukraine is a tract of land claimed by the resident Slavic population. 
There are clear similarities with other participant countries. Slovakia was once part 
of Czechoslovakia, Tajikistan suffered a five-year civil war, and Azerbaijan and Georgia are 
still in a dispute. The presence of conflict across the region contributes to instability, which 
strains economies and education systems.
Geography poses a challenge for all the countries, especially for establishing clear 
policies concerning old and new neighbors. Unlike neighboring Ukraine and Romania, 
Moldova has no access to the nearby Black Sea and must have good cross-border relations 
to support its economy. Access to markets is important for all the countries. Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan still trade with Russia but also have borders with China. In the Caucasus, 
Iran and Turkey are more present in economic and other affairs. Latvia borders Russia but 
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Azerbaijan 77.97 15.6 14.5 15.6 33.4
Georgia 22.93 6.7 3.8 4.1 25.3
Kazakhstan 184.30 5.0 29.6 32.6 16.0
Latvia 41.61 –5.0 12.3 12.8 4.7
Moldova 10.76 7.3 1.95 2.0 20.8
Slovakia 123.10 6.4 44.9 46.9 2.9
Tajikistan 13.00 4.5 0.8 0.8 42.8
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Formulating policy is one of the obligations that come with independence from a 
much larger union. The economic future of these countries is still undecided, so education 
policy in regards to labor-force preparation is unclear. Moldova has lost its role in an enor-
mous command economy, and unemployment has soared. 
As in most of the other countries, changes have not come quickly enough for families 
to meet growing needs. Thirty percent of the population in Moldova is living on US$2 a day 
or less, the rate established to determine poverty levels in the region.11 A large segment of 
the population participates in shuttle trade or migrates abroad to find work and send remit-
tances home.12 As shown in Table 2, Moldova has not fared well in early independence. In 
2006, it had the second lowest GDP PPP, GDP per capita, and budget revenues among the 
countries in this study.
An element of the transition in Moldova concerns its language and alphabet. Much 
of the Moldovan population speaks Russian as well as Romanian. Russian was the 
lingua franca of the Soviet republics, but with independence the currency of Russian 
has diminished. Policy had to be adopted to prepare the population for the demands of 
modernization.
This phenomenon, which has occurred in all the other republics in this study, pres-
ents unique challenges as societies must create new written material and adopt new vocabu-
laries to satisfy their inhabitants’ language preferences. This process has been difficult for 
older populations, as most of the countries have adopted languages based on the Latin 
alphabet, rather than the Cyrillic. Parents schooled in Russian (or in a language that once 
used Cyrillic script but has now made the switch), may have difficulty helping their young 
children read.
Schools have also suffered. After a long period of Soviet pedagogy, which was directly 
concerned with training students to fill specific roles in a command economy, schools lack 
direction. The school structure goes unchanged—students progress from multiyear nursery 
schools (kindergartens) to elementary and middle schools, often remaining with the same 
group of 20 or so children. At the secondary-school level, students can choose to follow 
vocational or professional tracks which can lead to higher education. In those countries that 
have chosen to join the Bologna process, higher-education programs are beginning to look 
more like those of their European counterparts.
Challenges have been faced by all of the newly independent states of Eurasia, but their 
transitions began from the same place and followed similar stages. The hope for the future 
rests with the ability of new generations to deal with the challenges. Their preparation, that 
is, the education of youth, faces an internal threat—the rise of informal payments. 
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Hiding in the Twilight
When the superstructure of the Soviet Union gave way, formal ways to manage the transition 
were not readily available. Where formal economic activity slowed, the black market rose to 
fill the space. When power and authority were vague and unsteady, corruption was able to 
take hold. For education, parental payments filled the vacuum left by budgetary deficits and 
institutional confusion. To understand the rise of informal payments, we turn our attention 
to Latvia, one of the Baltic states. 
In comparison to Moldova, Latvia has weathered the transition on better terms and 
perhaps with better results. Although some of this republic’s progress is due to its late 
incorporation into the Soviet space, its membership in the European Union (EU) has done 
much to hasten reform. Despite this, Latvia is still one of the poorest nations in the EU. It 
has also been unable to shed aspects of its Soviet past.
The Soviets’ strong system of education was a source of pride for both the government 
and the public. By the late 1960s, opportunities arose for young people to pursue professional 
and academic careers through higher education instead of sticking to largely vocational 
tracks that had been important for earlier industrialization efforts. By the late 1970s and 
into the 1980s, most of today’s parents had enjoyed the benefits of free public education, 
complete with opportunities to study abroad and to receive quality instruction.
After independence from the Soviet Union, much of the infrastructure was left in 
place, but educational resources quickly and severely contracted. Ministries of education, 
which had dealt with the implementation of outside policy, now had to run whole systems 
on diminished budgets. 
During the 1990s, instability was a common characteristic of the structures, content, 
and funding of education. The meager resources collected by central governments had to 
be parceled out and were insufficient to cover basic expenses. In some places, teachers went 
unpaid for months. Meanwhile, schools tried to continue to function. To help them, parents 
and other community members lent assistance as they could. 
In the Soviet period, parents were responsible for school uniforms, stationery, the pur-
chase of lunches and snacks, and fees for extracurricular activities. Costs for these expenses 
were heavily subsidized and few families, if any, were unable to cover these expenses. The 
only informal payments provided by parents were token presents, volunteer work at events, 
and occasional contributions for school repairs. Some additionally paid for private tutor-
ing, but these services were not provided by teachers from their child’s school. During this 
time, funds for education were sufficient, and informal payments were a very small part of 
household expenses. 
Each of the countries tried to extend the inherited social contract. Education was seen 
as a basic right. Most of the newly independent states adopted constitutions with a clause 
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similar to Article 112 in the Latvian Constitution: “Everyone has the right to an education. 
The state shall provide an opportunity to acquire elementary and secondary education free 
of charge. Elementary education is compulsory.”
States have had difficulty fulfilling this promise. Throughout the 1990s, the situation 
was rocky. Funding did not reach schools and sometimes salaries were not paid. Today, after 
15 years of independence, countries are able to achieve steadier economic growth and to 
allocate more funds for education. 
Table 3.







Azerbaijan 9,500 2.1 5.50
Georgia 5,000 3.1 13.10
Kazakhstan 12,000 2.3 9.80
Latvia 17,800 5.1 20.70
Moldova 2,500 7.6 —
Slovakia 22,600 3.9 11.90
Tajikistan 1,800 3.4 8.80
At the time of the PIPES study, education expenditures in Latvia were on a par with 
the EU standard, but the nation’s GDP was only about 60 percent of the EU average. Its 
expenditures are still higher than those of most of the counterparts in this study. Latvian 
expenditures per student are even higher (see Table 3).16 Government funds for education 
across the region are enough to pay salaries, but leave schools to fend for themselves.
In order to help the schools, parents stepped in. Class groups and their parents (by 
extension) usually take responsibility for classroom expenses, including painting the room, 
providing tea, and covering other costs. Parents were also asked by the school to fund repairs 
and maintenance. Private tutoring filled additional gaps. In some countries, parents are also 
asked to cover heating costs or other expenses the state should cover. 
After a decade and a half, these payments have become standard practice. The rela-
tionship between schools and parents has changed. In many cases, schools began to depend 
on parents for regular and expected income. Parents have become a financial resource, 
rather than mere service recipients.
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It isn’t easy to get people to discuss the specifics of the payment process. If pressed, 
parents say that the regulations are vague and that the financial status of schools is not 
stable. They may also admit that they have resorted to questionable means for noble ends. 
However, many are uncertain whom to blame. None of these payments is documented; 
expected payments remain informal and shadowy. 
Some Latvian parents have described payments as “hiding in the twilight” because 
they are neither documented nor tracked. They have not become part of other budgetary or 
planning processes. Instead, they are shadow resources that seem to be regularly exploited, 
their terms and procedures shrouded in ambiguity. 
Over the period of early independence, informal payments have become a part of 
education. The ways they are used to fund education and related activities exceed the ways 
private funds are used for public purposes in the rest of the world. For example, parents give 
presents of increasing value to teachers throughout the year and often do not consider the 
combined cost. Some buy textbooks or copy them rather than demanding them for free as 
promised. Many seek a host of private tutors for exam preparation while continuing to send 
their children to school so that they receive a diploma. 
None of these costs should be borne by them, but parents pay them to guarantee that 
their children finish school. These payments need to be taken out of the shadows and be 
brought into the light. As the Latvians demand, these resources should be clearly accounted 
for. 
Professional Resources
While parental payments may be a shadowy activity in most of these countries, Tajikistan 
faces a more urgent and obvious challenge. The poorest nation in this study as well as the 
least populous, it has endured a five-year civil war in the early years of independence and 
its economic development has lagged behind its counterparts. 
With limited natural resources, Tajikistan has struggled to establish a stable economy. 
The country is mountainous, and much of the population is isolated. With less than 7 
percent arable land, the country tries to augment its cotton production with mining and 
industry. Not surprisingly, unemployment is high and two-thirds of the population lives in 
poverty. To make ends meet, a large number of citizens work as manual laborers in Russia 
and send home remittances. 
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Table 4.












Azerbaijan 86.6 20.6 6.0 62.6 31.4
Georgia 69.7 11.5 12.8 18.4 58.8
Kazakhstan 2,717.3 8.3 5.8 39.4 54.7
Latvia 64.6 28.2 3.3 22.3 74.4
Moldova 33.8 54.5 17.3 21.5 61.2
Slovakia 48.8 29.2 2.6 33.4 65.0
Tajikistan 143.1 6.5 23 29.4 47.6
Because of its meager resources and relative isolation, material improvement has 
largely eluded those who have remained at home. Even after 15 years of independence, life in 
Tajikistan is little changed from what it was in the late Soviet period, especially in compari-
son to the other countries in this study. This is particularly true for schools and education. 
Understanding the roles played by teachers is useful in understanding the rise of 
informal payments as a practice and its social consequences. Soviet teachers were well-
trained and held in high regard. In small villages and communities, they were often the 
only trained professionals aside from doctors, and were consulted on various matters. As 
representatives of a monolithic system, they were models of authority. 
In contemporary Tajikistan, teachers pride themselves on this sense of professional-
ism. However, their professionalism and even their jobs are under threat as schools lose 
resources and contract. In some places, schoolrooms have been vacated not only by the 
decline in retention, but also by the frequent absenteeism of both students and faculty 
members. Shadow education in the form of self-study, private tutoring, and preparation 
courses outside schools have begun to play a surrogate role, especially for college-bound 
students.18 
Emigration and career changes have also reduced the pool of qualified educators. One 
parent reported hearing that more than 2,500 teachers had left the profession during the 
civil war. The only remaining school in the village has only two educators with advanced 
degrees—one is the principal and the other the lead teacher.
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Through the transition, the prestige of the profession has been tarnished. Most teach-
ers have attempted to maintain professionalism and hold onto their positions. They try to 
balance their social relationships and professional tasks with their required fund-raising 
efforts. Others have taken advantage of their positions and approached students opportu-
nistically.
Income Both Private and Public
“[T]he various components of a teacher’s full or real income are funded from 
various sources: from the central budget, local budget, and the school budget. 
In addition, an important source of income . . . is private tutoring and other 
‘fees’ retrieved from parents (for special classes, but also gifts for special occa-
sions, sale of booklets produced by teachers, semi-mandatory after school activi-
ties organized by teachers). These private costs of education, paid by parents to 
teachers, need also be considered as part of the regular teacher’s income.”
Source: Gita Steiner-Khamsi & Christine Harris-Van Keuren (2008) p. 18. 
Saddled with low salaries and rising costs of living, some teachers ask for money to 
supplement their income. Others withhold instruction in order to charge students in private. 
A few take bribes for falsifying grades and other results. A small number seek additional 
income by working in other sectors, taking extra shifts, or holding positions at multiple 
institutions. The greater number have tried to weather the rough period like the rest of the 
population. Absenteeism and inappropriate conduct are more common than they were. The 
predicament is made worse by having to collect informal payments for the school.
At schools, teachers serve as intermediaries between the administration and the com-
munity. The duty to collect or request fees often falls to them. This unwelcomed responsi-
bility can lead to quarrels. In Latvia, it is the teacher who repeatedly phones students and 
parents who don’t make payments. A student in Azerbaijan commented on the situation 
by saying, “Teachers are forced to beg.” The value of the education received after making 
payments is in question. “Grades increase, but knowledge doesn’t,” is the appraisal of a Mol-
dovan parent. Such concerns reveal how the practice of informal payments can contaminate 
relationships and diminish the profession. 
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Focus-group discussions in Tajikistan revealed how incidences of unprofessional 
behavior have become more common and more threatening. One parent said,
“Everything depends on the teacher. If the teacher likes her profession and is 
committed to it, then you and your family are lucky. I was not so lucky. My son 
had a nightmare of a situation. On International Woman’s Day, the teacher told the 
students who brought gifts to give her best regards to their parents and to tell them 
her thanks. Then she scolded the others by instructing them to tell their parents, 
‘How you have treated me will be reflected in the way I treat your child.’”
Education professionals across the region have witnessed an increase in unprofes-
sional behavior. In 2007, an education official in Slovakia was convicted on formal corrup-
tion charges, but such cases are rare. Unprofessional behavior is generally permissible given 
teachers’ former authority and the systemic lack of accountability.
There are exceptions, however. Another Tajik parent spoke of ceasing to pay a teacher 
whose performance the payments failed to improve. Another explained that his son’s teacher 
never asked for money and was very professional. “Even though that was several years ago, 
we still keep in touch.” But most agree that as long as even a small percentage of teachers 
escape accountability for inappropriate behavior, all are suspect.
“I think the quality of education should be measured not by one child, but by the 
school,” a Tajik parent said. “If we look to the school as a whole, we will find few profes-
sional teachers. I was a teacher and when I look back, I understand why we weren’t really 
professionals.”
Some teachers and principals have understood the importance of accountability to 
their professional stature. One parent noted that the “large, fat ledger notebook” used to 
keep accounts was proof of the teacher’s professionalism and responsibility. Still many par-
ents find it hard to question these former authority figures, especially since doing so calls 
attention to larger faults. 
For every person who is nostalgic for Soviet-era pedagogy, there is another who points 
out that it was teacher-centered and didactic. The curricula were slanted toward the develop-
ment of skills for work in a command economy. Soviet teachers were made for that era. 
Under the current transition, change can occur, but needs and desires must be 
defined. Governments already understand that open-market economies with global links 
require new curricula for the development of new skills. Reforms should promote account-
ability and professionalism.
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The Parents’ Predicament
The focus-group discussions in Tajikistan gave parents an opportunity to talk about pressing 
issues. They chose mainly to talk about the role of teachers, and many expressed dissatisfac-
tion. They are not alone in their concern. Questions about pressure and expectations were 
included in the PIPES survey. Similar sentiments were expressed in focus groups in all 
seven countries. Most responses to these questions did not completely answer why parents 
participate in the corrupt processes or allow their children to. But in Azerbaijan the research 
team further explored the question of why parents give payments. 
Rationalizations for why parents had to pay from their own pockets were easy to make, 
but these answers were rarely deep. The fundamental wish of all the parents was to make 
a better future for their children by helping them to finish schooling. Many were unclear 
about the mechanisms of financial management for schools, but they knew the school 
was in need.
Since the needs of a school are shared by friends, neighbors, relatives, and the local 
community, it is difficult to refuse them assistance. It is easy to choose to give money either 
on request or through personal initiative. These motivations illustrate two categories of pres-
sure: coercion and compulsion.19 
Coercion in this sense means the use of overt or implied threats to get something 
accomplished. In the case of parental payments for education, the threat was made or under-
stood that a child would suffer if payments were not given. The rationales for this category 
usually involved issues of education finance, school management or administration, or edu-
cation quality. 
Compulsion is the result of an internal motivation to participate. Parents act from an 
emotional or rational sense of obligation. Their payments are often made out of habit, under 
social pressure, or from a desire to create or preserve social capital. All three cases reflect an 
interest in building and maintaining good social relationships. 
Coercion is much easier to trace than compulsion. It is also easier to control through 
accountability and transparency measures such as documentation and public reporting. 
Compulsion, however, can be harder to detect and even more difficult to determine in 
nature. One of the most convincing indicators of the existence of negative-end compulsion 
in Azerbaijan today is the increased size, value, and frequency of gift-giving.
During the Soviet period, gifts were given on a few rare occasions, such as Interna-
tional Women’s Day or at the school-leaving ceremony called The Last Bell. Gifts were simple 
tokens of appreciation. Today, a single flower that cost less than 50 cents has been replaced 
by boxes of expensive chocolates or large bouquets of exotic flowers. Gifts can be given for 
many occasions. In some instances giving becomes competitive. 
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This phenomenon is more prevalent in urban settings than in rural areas where 
communities are close-knit. In urban schools, building good relationships is often more 
important than studying hard. This is particularly true in capital cities where up to half the 
national population may reside. In a densely populated settlement in social transformation, 
problems are more often solved through relationships than through individual merit. 
Not only have the values of gifts increased, but parents and children more often 
feel that teachers and principals expect them. Even parent associations pressure others to 
make a contribution. As with so many other kinds of informal payment, the notion of 
voluntarism has begun to slip away. Even unrequested parental payments tend to be made 
under pressure. 
Most parents remember that as students and as workers in the Soviet era, volunteer-
ism was often mandatory. They were expected to participate in Saturday clean-ups called 
subbotniks. Attendance at special events or activities was expected. 
As parents they feel that they must contribute, even if it negatively impacts their 
limited incomes and resources. Many say they don’t have a choice. Rarely do parents get 
together to discuss this issue in the open or take the time to evaluate it in private. Their 
predicament is at the intersection of corruption and civil society. 
Theories of corruption in education often point to remedies that focus on the govern-
ment and the service provider. Rarely do they attempt to deal with the community and get 
it to take responsibility for its involvement. However, it seems clear that if parents were 
to refuse en masse to make payments and to insist on procedures, the chance for corrupt 
behavior would be lessened. 
Azerbaijan presents an interesting case for this discussion because corruption there 
has received a lot of attention over the period of independence. This small state became inde-
pendent in the midst of a prolonged conflict and during an oil boom. The renewed access to 
Caspian oil brought in numerous outsiders seeking lucrative contracts. 
As the oil business resumed, Azerbaijan began to receive annual attention from 
organizations such as Transparency International. This organization published a corrup-
tion perception index for much of this period, and Azerbaijan sat on or near the bottom of 
the scale of freedom from corruption. In 2006, Azerbaijan stood between Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan, but had an improved rating from the year before. Latvia and Slovakia were at 
the higher end of the scale. 
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Table 5.






Score Overall Corruption Civil Society S. Trust S. Capital
Azerbaijan 2.4 6.00 6.25 5.25 0.19 1.88
Georgia 2.8 4.68 5.00 4.00 0.21 2.11
Kazakhstan 2.6 6.39 6.50 6.75 — —
Latvia 4.7 2.07 3.00 1.50 0.24 9.93
Moldova 3.2 4.96 6.00 5.25 0.22 2.09
Slovakia 4.7 2.14 3.25 2.25 0.26 2.72
Tajikistan 2.2 5.96 6.25 6.25 — —
Freedom House rated countries by degree of democratization and economic liberaliza-
tion in a report entitled Nations in Transit. This report included a more nuanced look because 
it assessed different areas, always in comparison with the subject country’s performance in 
the preceding year. It too included a score for corruption and evaluated Azerbaijan at the 
low end of the scale. Its score of 6.25 had remained stable since 2001. Again, Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan received similar ratings.
Nations in Transit also reported a score for civil society, a term that is often used to 
signify community involvement. Higher performance in this area was reported for Azer-
baijan in comparison to its corruption score. Its score for civil society had been steadily 
decreasing since 2003. For informal payments and parental participation, the combination 
of these scores suggests a need to take a closer look at the role of the community in the 
payment process. 
The social trust scores also reveal a low score for Azerbaijan. Of the 45 countries 
surveyed, Azerbaijan is ranked ninth from the bottom. It also scored low on social trust 
and social capital, criteria that measure inter-connectedness, integrity, trust, and reliability. 
While part of this result is due to Azerbaijanis’ unfamiliarity with civil society organizations, 
parents and community members often feel left out of the loop.23 Developing relations 
between community organizations and the population is necessary for improving the role 
of parent organizations. 
It is important to note that some informal payments are necessary and encouraged. 
However, many should not be. In Azerbaijan and many of the other countries, parents often 
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submit to making both types of payments, because they feel that they have no power or 
control. Some even feel that they may be punished if they refuse. 
Although schools are no longer the extension of monolithic systems, they have yet to 
establish their local institutional credentials. As local entities, they must still win the trust of 
their communities. Parent associations can play the role of mediators and monitors, but only 
if rules of accountability are adopted to ensure that parents are not taken advantage of.
Caught In Between
Improved accountability and professionalism are key elements for ensuring equity and 
access in education. They are not sufficient, though, to eliminate threats to child safety 
or to minimize other negative effects that arise from informal payments. Even in the best 
cases, children are caught in the middle and special attention is required to provide the best 
learning environment possible. 
Slovakia is an interesting case, especially given its strong performance in recent years. 
Once part of Czechoslovakia, the republic did well in early independence. With Poland to 
the north and Hungary to the south, the republic sits in the heart of Eastern Europe. Like 
her neighbors, Slovakia has made strong reforms and developed well. 
Development is a tricky concept to evaluate, but international organizations like the 
United Nations Development Program offer a set of measures. Slovakia rates well in stan-
dard measures of development and is considered highly developed, like Kazakhstan and 
Latvia. In education, Latvia and Kazakhstan have achieved higher scores than Slovakia. The 
achievement of gender equity is a newer measure of a nation’s development, and Slovakia 
also scores well on the UNDP Gender Equity Measure (GEM), as does Latvia. Kazakhstan, 
however, ranks much lower, with only Azerbaijan achieving a lower score (see Table 6).
Literacy level has also been regarded as a traditional measure of development; it was 
used to show modernization and growth by the Soviets. Slovakia achieved a surprising 74.4 
percent. In contrast, Georgia reported a perfect 100 percent. While literacy rates throughout 
the Soviet Union were very high, it is remarkable that so many of these countries still report 
such high rates, despite the challenges described here.24 One might expect lower scores 
from the language and alphabet changes over the past decade and a half alone.
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Table 6.
Human Development Measures25
HDI GEM Education26 Literacy
(ranking) (ranking) ( index) (% population)
Azerbaijan Medium—97 88 0.882 99.3
Georgia Medium—93 — 0.914 100
Kazakhstan High—71 74 0.973 99.6
Latvia High—44 33 0.961 99.8
Moldova Medium—113 63 0.892 99.2
Slovakia High—41 34 0.921 74.4
Tajikistan Medium—124 — 0.896 99.6
It is conceivable that by admitting to a lower literacy rate Slovakia has actually made 
stronger progress than its counterparts. The country research team reported not only a 
lower rate of informal payments, but also a clearer notion of their organization. In doing 
this, they also uncovered ways that the public and the private have begun to overlap in the 
“education market.”
Their assessment divided parental contributions into three categories: required pay-
ments expected at the beginning of the school year; payments for events and extra-curricular 
activities throughout the year; and unexpected payments required during the school year. 
These payments could also be divided between payments for the class group and those made 
to benefit the whole school. 
They also noted that the government decided to deal more formally with private contri-
butions for public works, creating a tax-incentive program granting credit for philanthropic 
contributions and a State School Inspection Agency. While the agency continues to work and 
even publishes reports on its website, the tax-incentive program has disappeared. 
While it may have been too early to provide tax incentives given low familiarity with 
“formalized” philanthropy and taxation, Slovak parents do accept some new types of pay-
ments. One of the new formal payments now accepted is for school security schemes. 
Parents pay an additional fee to ensure school safety. Their motivation comes from the 
perception that it will not otherwise be addressed.
If responsibility for physical protection lies with the school, this charge can be inter-
preted as extortion. But Slovak parents seem content with the arrangement. More parents 
across the region believe that some payments like this are necessary. In central city schools 
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in the capital of Azerbaijan, parents not only insist on a security service, but have also offered 
to pay for video-camera installation. 
The payments that make parents unhappy are irregular ones that come up during 
the school year, especially if they do not directly contribute to the educational process. In 
the spirit of privatization and the growth of entrepreneurship in Eurasia, the classroom has 
become a part of the marketplace. 
Slovak teachers allow sales agents of various types into the classroom to hawk wares 
and to demand payments from children. Sometimes they sell material that is described as 
supplemental for lessons but is not used in class. At other times, objects such as geographi-
cal globes are sold and students are pressured into buying them. It is unknown whether 
teachers or the schools take a cut of these sales.
These three activities each represent a mixture of public and private enterprise. In 
the first, the government attempted to allow private (philanthropic) assistance for the public 
good (school). In the second, the private (parents) took responsibility for a public service 
(safety) by paying a private firm to operate within a public space. In the final one, the public 
space has been opened for a private activity (business) to take advantage of another private 
sphere (children as consumers). 
Each of these is a type of informal payment, and all of these seem to go against the 
basic principles of accountability in public service provision. More importantly, the child sits 
in the middle of all this. In one, the child loses a potential benefit. In the next, he is seen as 
a target. In the last, the child is targeted and the teacher and school are complicit. 
These three stories serve to remind us that discussion of reform should acknowledge 
the responsibility to protect children. They should not be used as pawns nor should they be 
exposed to transactions or serve as intermediaries. As one child in Azerbaijan said, “I feel 
embarrassed when I see my teacher beg for money.” The children should not grow up in a 
situation that places them in the unfinished negotiation of public and private. 
Staggering Compliance
Standardizing parental payments is one of the most important steps needed to regulate 
the scope and impact of informal private contributions to the costs of education. The role 
of policy is to develop legislation to this end. Kazakhstan has striven to establish a system 
that is responsive to the needs of the population and makes use of the resources that it has 
on hand. After conducting survey-based research, it has put legislative, administrative, and 
community-based procedures in place to manage school finances, parental payments in 
particular. 
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Establishing regulations and compliance mechanisms is no easy task, particularly 
in a country of Kazakhstan’s size. Its population is spread over nearly three million square 
kilometers, six times the combined landmass of the other participant countries. In physical 
terms, the republic is enormous; yet its population is only about twice that of the next larg-
est participant country. 
Large enough to be considered a region unto itself, Kazakhstan is sometimes seen 
as a part of Central Asia. Unlike other Central Asian states, however, its population at the 
time of the Soviet breakup was roughly half Slavic, a balance to which some attribute the 
success of its reform efforts. It also stands out because of its vast oil reserves, the influx of 
businesses from east and west, and the related efforts to develop a stable economy. All of 
this has positively influenced its education system. 
It has tried to ensure sufficient funding for education. In 1993, when the educa-
tion crisis in the region was at its height, the Kazakh government allocated approximately 
US$250 million for education. By 2006, education expenditures had increased to US$2 bil-
lion, twice the amount allocated two years earlier (NCEQA 2007: 11). Despite this massive 
increase, Kazakhstan still has a low per-capita education expenditure. As its oil revenues 
increase, the government is expected to ensure even higher levels of funding, an ability not 
shared by all of its counterparts.
Like other countries in the study, Kazakhstan guarantees free education in its constitu-
tion as well as in its law on education. The primary legislative document governing educa-
tion, other than the national constitution, is the Law on Education, which was last updated 
in 2007. This law provides for collective leadership through trustee boards, councils of 
teachers, education methodologists, and other specialists. Schools have individual charters 
that outline a single-person management and shared-leadership principle. 
A View from the Field
A representative of the Human Rights Mission, a Kazakh public association, 
observed that, “legislation must be more precise in detailing mechanisms of 
parental and community participation in managing the property and financial 
assets of educational institutions.” 
 He added: “The notion that Boards of Trustees serve as a form of 
collective leadership does not match the more modest advisory role that they 
have in practice. Parent committees actively participate in gathering money to 
meet school needs. However, their activities, jurisdiction, and procedures have 
no legal status. The law only applies to public funds.”
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Similar documents and groups exist in the other six countries, including specific sec-
tions of education laws. Article 64 of Kazakhstan’s law allows schools to raise revenue by 
charging for services not otherwise prohibited. Article 61 defines the system of education 
financing as consisting of national, provincial, local, and other sources of income. 
This inclusiveness indicates a commitment to efficiency, productivity, transparency, 
and independence as ideals. Such thoughtful legislation distinguishes Kazakhstan from its 
counterparts. Procedural changes have followed on legal ones.
Kazakhstan has sought to reduce opportunities for corruption and improve the use 
of funds, prohibiting any and all parental payments in 2002. In its report entitled “On 
measures to strengthen compliance control over paid services at Republic of Kazakhstan 
schools,” it attempted to stop the “shady” practice of exaction of parental payments. 
Despite this step and efforts to publicize the decision, payments are still made, often 
in the guise of donations to a school. Since the regulations material to this report are both 
ambiguous and contradictory, it is difficult to offer suggestions for enforcing them. 
This experience is not unique to Kazakhstan. In Latvia, parents reported that class 
payments are collected for tea, water, parties, and copying supplies. While Latvian schools 
have special accounts for class payments for such items, only 12 percent of teachers report 
using them. In Tajikistan, the parents’ board maintains a cash box and a bank account, but 
neither is widely used. Funds are collected and dispersed by other, unauthorized and pos-
sibly illegal means.
Although legal provisions for informal payments have been made, many community 
members still have a poor understanding of the legal mechanisms which should regulate 
parental contributions. The level of understanding required by parents is the concern and 
responsibility of parents’ committees and boards of trustees. But they rarely take on these 
duties.
State funds, which are disbursed at the local level, cover the majority of education-
related expenses, but leave very little for discretionary costs. An examination of one school’s 
budget showed that only one-third of the cost for repairs comes from the state budget. The 
remainder comes from the parents.
One school is not enough to prove the case. Kazakhstan has 8,000 schools and about 
3 million students. The survey revealed that parents from various regions make different 
payments, both in amount and frequency. In total they equal about 12 percent of the state 
budget allocated for education. Parents in Almaty and Astana, which have both seen exten-
sive economic development, pay the most. Parents in the capital, Akmola, pay about a third 
as much. Different regions and populations require different approaches to the problem.
With this much variation, strong planning is essential. Plans must take the past as 
well as the future into account. One of the parents summarized the situation like this: 
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“It is necessary to know history. All of these funds appeared somewhere in the mid-1990s. 
These were hard times for education. Many problems had to be solved in order to maintain 
schools. Thus, the idea to maintain the schools by their own devices appeared. At that time, 
the school funds arose to ensure the school functioned adequately.” 
Effective change occurs throughout a society, not only at the top or in the center. 
Responsibility must be borne across all groups and by all stakeholders. Planning must involve 
the broadest possible community. Legislation must be written to accommodate amendments 
as countries discover how best to serve their populations. These amendments might also 
address the practical application of and compliance with the law as it is implemented. 
Emergency Response
Our final case focuses on the Republic of Georgia, which is located in the heart of the Cau-
casus. Although it has a good deal in common with Moldova—size of population, history 
of wine production, deep financial problems—Georgia has come through its transition in 
better condition. Its economy during the Soviet period was strong; it has mild weather and 
a rich history. Georgia has worked hard during independence, possibly to show that it is a 
part of Europe, but also to recover its former prosperity. 
Although Georgia now has one of the weaker economies of the nations presented 
here, it has been able to increase education expenditures by nearly 200 percent. These 
increases are still not enough to cover all education-related costs, and the government has 
understood that parental contributions act as a compensatory mechanism. It did, though, 
want to make sure that the funding intended for any given school actually reached it.
To ensure that this occurred it initiated a significant reform program. First, funding 
for schools was decentralized so that each school received funding on a per student basis. 
Next, schools were transformed into independent entities with individual bank accounts and 
with the right to attract additional financial resources and to raise income through entrepre-
neurial activities. Finally, boards of trustees were formed in order to participate in budget 
planning and oversee spending. While some of these steps have been or are being consid-
ered throughout Eurasia, they have rarely been adopted in combination. Some countries 
have granted the legal right for schools or parent associations to have and manage their own 
bank accounts, but this innovation has not been taken up by many. Entrepreneurial activities 
by schools are even more rare; if they occur, they do so only as shadow activities.
More frequent occurrences are the formation of associations consisting of parents, 
other community members and even school employees. These groups typically play an advi-
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sory role rather than exert actual influence. Boards of trustees are not unheard of in the 
region but have had a similar fate. 
Parental Perceptions of Per Student Funding
Georgian parents were asked to give their early impressions of per student 
funding implemented as a state reform in 2006. 
  Positive Aspects
  — Improves school’s material and technical base
  — Ensures timely salary payment
  — Can establish separate budget
  — Makes schools more competitive
  — May influence retention
  — Implies quality improvement
  Negative Aspects
  — Largest portion goes for utilities and administrative costs
  — Not sufficient to offer optimum salaries, purchase equipment, 
 or organize cultural events
  — Impossible to use funds to improve material / technical base
  — Schools with small enrolments reduce staff and release funds
Georgia’s 2005 law on general education made specific allowances for these boards. 
It stipulated that they be composed of a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 12 elected 
persons from among parents and teachers. They also have a student and possibly a local 
government representative. The boards approve school budgets, provide oversight, and 
advise on school management. They also evaluate nominations and elect candidates for 
principal. Boards in Georgia may even force the school principals to cancel contracts with 
individual teachers. 
The board has increased authority in Georgia because of per student funding. Based on 
the “money follows the student” principle, an amount for each student is sent to the school. 
These amounts vary according to the type of school. In 2006, city schools received about 
US$120 per student. Village schools received 50 percent more, and schools in mountainous 
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regions received 80 percent more. Small schools may also receive extra funds from the 
central budget and have special permission to finance other activities by local means. 
The difference in required funding between urban and rural schools is striking. City 
schools receive less money per student and are believed to have larger class sizes. The PIPES 
study revealed that twice as many urban parents are making informal payments. In the sur-
vey, only one out of 23 rural principals reported receipt of such contributions, in comparison 
to one-third of urban principals.
Although longer term research is required, it seems that per student funding is reduc-
ing both the size and frequency of parental payments. Most parents are pleased with the 
introduction of the system, but they are also able to identify improvements that are still 
needed. This ability to make such identifications sets parents in Georgia apart from those 
in the other countries studied. 
In Georgia, the issue of salary still stands out. The government sets the amount that 
teachers are to receive based on outstanding debt and available resources. A standard teach-
er’s salary is about two-thirds the national average wage.27 In Tajikistan, full-time teachers 
receive only US$25 a month, 70 percent of the national average. 
In oil economies, teachers receive larger amounts, US$85 in Azerbaijan or US$195 
in Kazakhstan. But these amounts are still only a little more than half the average national 
wage (Steiner-Khamsi & Harris-Van Keuren 2008: 12). Parents and boards would like to 
raise these salaries but are not yet able to do so. Similar situations can be found across 
the region. 
Georgia’s reform effort has had decent results when compared with other national 
programs. Still, much remains to be done. The evaluation of this program, conducted for 
the Ministry of Education and Science, noted signs of progress in the successful formation 
of boards and strong involvement of parents (Shapiro, et al. 2007). This finding illustrates 
the potential for decentralization and local-level reform hinted at in other country research 
for this study.
The evaluation also noted the ability of some schools to manage the budget, collect 
information, and make strategic plans. Most schools were not sufficiently active or prepared, 
however. Information was not always shared and decision making was not always demo-
cratic. As a general conclusion, the Georgia reform project serves as a baseline experience 
that requires further clarification and critical attention to training teachers and administra-
tors to work with the new system (Shapiro, et al. 2007). 
The biggest problem with this reform and similar initiatives harks back to early 
Soviet education reforms—shaped by John Dewey, among others—that were instituted 
without a proper infrastructure. But while the Soviet reforms were imported, their inde-
pendence gives these republics the chance to shape their own development. They must 
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respond to the rising emergency represented by informal payments but not be too hasty in 
their response. 
Summary
When the Soviet Union broke up, the countries in this study all began transitions to inde-
pendence. Although they began from the same place, they are no longer similar enough 
to allow for easy statistical comparison. Each has faced the challenges of independence on 
its own terms and learned different lessons. One of the most important lessons from the 
PIPES study is that populations are beginning to confront the myth of free education and 
are prepared to take on the responsibilities that come with independence.
In the cases presented, we describe aspects of the transition across the region and 
the complex conditions under which the phenomenon of informal payments has arisen. 
By looking first at Moldova, we described the basic situation these countries faced during 
early independence. The case of Latvia shows how informal payments arose. We presented 
cases of teachers, parents, and children. Stories from Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Slovakia 
highlight important elements of the scope, motivation, and impact of informal payments 
and focus on accountability, equity, and access. The last two cases reviewed governmental 
measures to regulate informal payments, and each underscores the need for integrated, 
long-term planning. 
These stories give us only a glimpse of the phenomenon of informal payments across 
Eurasia. The PIPES study has enabled the project team to better understand its role in mak-
ing payments less taxing on parents, allowing the payments to be seen as investments in 
education, society, and the future. These stories underline the importance of determining 
the real extent of informal payments and of initiating relevant changes. This is the theme 





As discussed in the preceding chapter, informal payments for education are easier to under-
stand once they are set in the context of the far-reaching social transformations that are tak-
ing place in the region. The seven countries’ stories cannot provide a comprehensive view of 
the challenges in education. Articles about education through the period of transformation, 
such as those found in Transitions Online, demonstrate how the transition has affected all 
the nations of Eurasia.28
Transitions Online has education articles going back to 2004. They address issues such 
as financing, curriculum, and inclusion; and more than 60 touch on some aspect of corrup-
tion in education. A third of these speak directly about bribery and graft. Nearly all call for a 
change, but few propose remedies or describe actions intended to bring about change. 
Transparency International also dedicates a portion of its website to corruption in 
education.29 However, it is in its health section that informal payments receive serious 
attention: 
Informal payments—charges for services or supplies that are supposed to be 
free—are common in many parts of the world, especially in developing and 
transition countries. While it is often difficult to draw a line between voluntary 
gifts and mandatory payment, extortion and payments that are better understood 
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as coping mechanisms for underpaid caregivers, there is little disagreement 
about the damaging effects of these payments on health systems worldwide. 
Informal payments undermine the quality of health services in general, by giving 
doctors incentives to provide those who pay with better treatment, and effectively 
rendering health services and drugs unaffordable to many. They also undermine 
the functioning of the health care system as a whole; governments may turn a blind 
eye to problems caused by under-funding and poor allocation when health services 
seem to be operating thanks to the system of informal payments.30
The point stands for education as well. Informal payments have received more atten-
tion as an issue in health care than in education. One reason for this is that they are easier to 
track and measure. Illnesses and injuries often require immediate treatment. If an informal 
payment cannot be made, dire consequences can result. In education, however, the phe-
nomenon of informal payments is more deeply embedded in the larger system and exacts 
longer-term costs. 
Pervasive Corruption 
“Corruption has penetrated all parts of Tajik education, starting from the ‘gifts’ 
parents give pre-school teachers to look better after their kids and ending into 
multi-thousand dollar bribes from senior university administrators to govern-
ment officials to get extra benefits for their schools.” (p. 14)
Source: Vladimir Briller (2007). Tajikistan country case study. Education for All by 2015: 
Will we make it?
Over the past 15 years, parents have contributed more and more to education, even 
without guarantees of quality or equity. It is not enough to assert that a problem exists; a 
response needs to be conceived. There is evidence enough to show us that private funds 
are covering what used to be a freely provided public good, but not what type of change is 
desired. The question is: how to bring about a change?
The answer to this question begins with discovering why payments must be made. In 
the PIPES focus-group discussions, parents often wanted to know why they had to pay for 
anything. They also understood that asking this question would not result in a satisfactory 
answer. Researchers, though, redirected the question: “If we understand that the govern-
ment cannot provide everything, what can it provide?” 
This question can be rephrased here. Since the constitutions of all the republics 
guarantee access to free education, what exactly is free? Every country’s circumstances 
differ and the reply will differ in every case too. Some governments may chose to cover all 
costs in order to guarantee full and free access to all pupils, including those with special 
needs or limited means. Other governments may decide to share costs. For example, 
governments may decide to cover basic costs for education that are necessary for school 
attendance while making parents responsible for other costs to allow fuller participation in 
extracurricular activities. 
In the end, a clear indication of who is responsible for each type of payment must 
be given. For example, an explanation of the fees for instructional materials should specify 
whether they are supplemental or necessary. If they are necessary for the educational pro-
cess but not provided by the school, what is the consequence for pupils who are unable 
to purchase them? When promising free education, the government has the obligation to 
indicate what services, materials, and other costs are covered in their budget. Governmental 
payments might even be itemized to define financial responsibility at the national, provin-
cial, and local level. 
One primary school teacher in Azerbaijan explained how the dilemma is passed 
down:
In the beginning of the school year, my students received student books free of 
charge and I got a teacher’s manual. To complete the package a student workbook 
was needed and available only in bookshops. Of course I asked parents to buy it. 
Immediately I saw that students who got the notebook are sitting together, but 
those who couldn’t sit separately. It is quite expensive. I was in a panic because 
the workbook had classroom tasks that would make my teaching easier and more 
interesting for the children. Those tasks required an individual copy in the hands 
of each student. I decided to use the class fund, which had been collected by the 
parents’ group for emergencies, to buy additional copies of workbooks for students 
who did not have it. For next year I have another plan. With the parents, we will buy 
one book and make copy for everybody in the class.
Practical discussions about costs and resources must take place. With public input, 
governments need to define who bears the responsibility for major expenses associated with 
education. Based on focus-group discussions across the region, an equitable breakdown of 
expenses is proposed in the following box. 
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Who Should Pay for What?
  Government should pay for:
 — Salaries
 — Operational/maintenance costs
 — Capital expenses
  — Teacher/staff consumable items
  — Items that remain school property
  — Instructional equipment
  — Basic tuition costs
  — Required extracurricular activities 
  Parents should pay for:
  — Extra fees
  — Additional tuition costs
  — Pupil consumable items 
  — Activity fees
  — Instructional material fees 
  — Optional extracurricular activities 
  — Items that become personal property 
If governments can provide only school facilities, teacher salaries, and basic training 
material, then sources for additional expenses must be agreed upon by parents and the com-
munity. In some situations, they might choose to allow local communities to cover basic 
maintenance costs through parent associations. These decisions must also include quality-
control measures and assurances of equity and access. 
The PIPES study showed that compulsory payments for mandatory educational ser-
vices represent the largest share of parental payments. With minimal control and ambiguous 
procedures, they present opportunities for corruption, double payments, counterfeit goods, 
poor quality, and more. For those expenses that parents have the primary responsibility to 
cover, formalized clarity is an outstanding need.
Some parental payments are presented as mandatory but are actually expenses that 
either should not be charged to parents or should not be expenses at all. For example, in 
certain cases, textbooks are expected to be bought by parents and then to remain the child’s 
property. In others, textbooks are provided for free but are sometimes “rented” out by the 
school. In still others, textbooks end up in the hands of local salesmen who then profit from 
this arrangement, which should never have been allowed. 
Since textbooks are essential for instruction, many stakeholders support state or 
municipal provision for a small fee or for free. However, the physical quality of the texts 
must be such as to allow them to last for a number of years. The content must remain 
unchanged so that new editions are not constantly needed. Final decisions on this and 
similar expenses, which are influenced by the state of national development, may not be 
possible until later.
Nonmandatory items though can be discussed right now and require case-by-case 
identification and consideration. Parents may choose to pay costs arising from elective and 
extracurricular activities. They should also be given the chance to make formal and voluntary 
contributions to the school. 
Suggested Donation Guidelines
  All donations must be on a voluntary basis 
  Provide clear information about need and purpose of donations
  Ask for donations more than once a year (preferably at the beginning of 
the year)
  Minimize reminders to parents
  Post information in public place about donations, receipts, and expendi-
tures
  Have parent associations or a designated staff person collect donations
  Limit (eliminate) student involvement in collection or information 
process
  Ensure that donors receive no benefit and nondonors suffer no conse-
quences
  Keep donations confidential
  Make event and activity participation optional
  Ensure that disadvantaged children may participate in all mandatory and 
optional school events and activities
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Whereas mandatory expenses might have set fees and payment procedures, donations 
require another set of rules (see box on previous page). Absent such rules, coercion, offers 
of special treatment, and misappropriation can corrupt the donation process. 
Other types of payments need review and control. Tutoring is one, especially if it 
involves teachers from the school or serves as a substitute for schooling. Gift-giving is 
another, particularly because the value and frequency of gifts has increased and the impor-
tance they have for informal social relations is now considerable. Reporting procedures 
should be established along with limits on the value, type, and frequency of payments. 
Defining payments of all types is important for reducing the incentive or opportunity 
for corruption. It will also lead to a decrease in the amounts of money collected and in 
financial pressure on households. If a formalization of the payment system encompasses 
philanthropic donations, public-private partnerships may also increase. Most importantly, 
these changes may lead to improvement in the critical policy areas of quality, access, and 
equity. A consideration of these changes requires a review of the conclusions on matters of 
scope, motivation, and impact.
Initial Conclusions
Here we review the conclusions of each study before discussing the advocacy role of NEPC 
members. The chapter closes, based on the experience of the members and their counter-
parts from around the world, with an agenda for action. We intend for all of the countries 
under study to identify a sound approach for determining the meaning of free education, 
an essential step toward drawing the line. The conclusions are presented in this section in 
three categories: the payment process, engagement, and policy issues.
The Payment Process
While legislation provides a framework that defines and supports school financing, includ-
ing the existence and use of parental payments, the functioning of the phenomenon requires 
clear procedures, a transparent payment mechanism. A first step is to define what is meant 
by payments as discussed above, followed by an explanation of what makes these definitions 
legal. The remainder of the process also requires clarification.
Effective school management is essential. It should make sure that public funds des-
ignated for education reach the schools and are used for their specified purposes. It should 
also eliminate dependence on parental payments, particularly on those of an ambiguous 
and informal nature. Schools should forego ad hoc reliance on parental payments in favor of 
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long-term, sustainable forecasting and budgeting. They should also be able to improve the 
quality of education, to retain students and teachers, and to develop a sustainable future.
Some research teams proposed developing a single form for analyzing schools’ 
effectiveness in attracting resources and in budgetary efficiency. This form would identify 
best practices and estimate costs across a school system. Another argument was made for 
greater school autonomy and community oversight for the management of funds and other 
resources. Changes such as these require school administrators and their local counterparts 
in parent associations and on boards of trustees to learn to exercise fiscal oversight. Train-
ing and professional development programs for teachers and administrators are needed in 
financial management, educational finance, documentation and reporting, decision making, 
fundraising, and the like. Ethics modules can also be included in preparatory courses and 
in-service training workshops. The potential for professionalization opportunities, such as 
merit review, codes of conduct, and certification, may also be explored. 
Where payments are necessary or desirable, transparency and accountability must 
also be integrated into procedures. As shown in the survey, most payments are processed 
without any documentation. Establishing clear procedures, including forms, receipts, and 
manuals, is essential to facilitate real change. Periodic reviews, reports, and public files 
should also be considered. Another option for financing education is to set up public-private 
partnerships, which will reinforce the role of parent associations and have specific rights for 
collection, distribution, and documentation of parental payments.
Schools should provide information on receipt procedures and use of contributions. 
Regular meetings may be held to discuss revenue requirements, collection, use, and distri-
bution. Guidelines should be established for handling potential problems. Minutes of any 
meetings should be publicly available. All community members should have easy access to 
all this information in writing.
To support transparency and accountability, measures aimed at public engagement 
are also recommended. While parent associations or boards of trustees are good mecha-
nisms, parents must not only be informed of all aspects of the payment process but also be 
brought in as participants in planning. Information provided in good time is essential to 
allow for discussion, consent, and planning within households. Transparency and account-
ability within parent and community organizations is also necessary.
Defining roles and responsibilities is important in rooting out discriminatory prac-
tices. The role of both teachers and children in the collection process, from communica-
tion to collection, should be diminished or eliminated. These actions will reduce strains on 
relationships and minimize pressure on children, parents, and even teachers while easing 
the administrative burden. A school administrator in cooperation with a parent-association 
representative should become responsible for collection, tracking, and reporting all contri-
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butions. Wire transfers or checks might be used, and all funds must be fully documented 
and contributors given receipts. 
All systems of accountability need alternate routes in case the primary ones run into 
obstacles. In anticipation of these and to build trust across groups, review agencies and 
procedures need to be defined. To enable parents to raise concerns and solve problems, con-
fidential hotlines or designated advocates might be made available. Reviews should ensure 
the proper use of funds from other sources, such as private donors or international sponsors. 
These reviews should consider the efficacy of exemptions and programs for disadvantaged 
children. 
Community Engagement
Recommendations for policy change and process improvement were based on inputs from 
research teams, survey respondents, and focus-group participants. The final set of recommen-
dations concern how to keep these parties engaged so that changes are satisfactorily imple-
mented. The suggestions for improving community engagement are divided into four parts. 
Decentralizing for Relevancy
Decentralization has been promoted as a means of making education more 
relevant by letting schools and communities make key decisions. In practice 
it has been used to encourage or force local communities to absorb more of 
the cost of local schools. Governments have overestimated the ability of local 
communities to contribute financial resources. Plans to increase parental par-
ticipation have not been generally successful.
Source: Education reforms in countries in transition: Policies and processes. Manila, Philip-
pines: Asian Development Bank. (2004). 
The first concerns a shared vision for policy goals. For policy to be effective, the teams 
suggested that stakeholders need to find a shared concept and agree on milestones. One sug-
gestion is to develop a model of a fair and transparent system. Such a step is necessary before 
dealing with details such as empowering and enabling school administrators or developing 
mechanisms for community oversight. 
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For improvements in education financing, school management, and education quality, 
it is important to keep all stakeholders constructively engaged. Skill-building, participation, 
attendance at public meetings, and joint problem-solving should all be encouraged. Identify-
ing roles and responsibilities can help maintain authority and respect. Engagement can also 
be extended to counterparts in other sectors, like health services, where informal payments 
are prevalent and many of the same participants are involved. 
In order to facilitate engagement, outreach activities have a significant role. Much 
of the population does not possess a solid working knowledge of the full context in which 
parental payments have taken hold. Some widely-held perceptions are based on erroneous 
information. A number of legal mechanisms and protections are known by only a few. 
Public and professional awareness programs should be organized in a variety of areas. 
Public and school authorities can take some responsibility for these, but community associa-
tions, media outlets, and other civil society organizations may have a broader reach. Themes 
may include basic findings on this phenomenon, both local and cross-regional, but might 
also highlight important legal details and other specifics of the national context. No matter 
what approach is adopted, it is important to set the stage for future cooperation. Sharing 
responsibilities and working together is important so that parties do not feel disenfranchised 
or excluded. 
Since schools play a pivotal role in youth development, engagement strategies may 
consider the creation (or expansion) of external groups that are able to serve as neutral par-
ties. Such groups can serve as resource points for consultation and training. Tailoring their 
services to meet specific needs and tackle systemic issues is important. In this capacity, 
they should not merely repeat familiar information, but serve as facilitators and advisors. 
Providing legal alternatives for illegal or inappropriate practices should be the focus of their 
activities. The presence of open community centers would permit constructive research 
about, discussion on, and promotion of educational quality and social equity.
Expert research is also necessary. While the PIPES study may serve as a basis for 
community, provincial, national, and even cross-regional discussion on this topic, it has 
also revealed a need for more precise tools to measure and track informal payments. The 
actual cost of this phenomenon as well as its effect on particular subcommunities must be 
investigated. Community engagement and outreach are important in developing a shared 
vocabulary for this process. Policy changes will also help to identify alternative approaches. 
Ongoing research efforts should focus on examining ways to diminish household 
burdens while improving community support and participation. School and community 
needs and conditions should be continually monitored in order to impart transparency to 
all transactions. Evaluation of school performance and innovation should be carried out to 
establish practical criteria for wide future use. 
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Policymaking
Good policy must ensure that parental payments have little or no negative effect on edu-
cational quality, access, and equity. The first step for establishing good policy begins with 
education finance. Many of the respondents had ideas about what needed to be done nation-
ally to ensure that schools receive sufficient funds. The most common answer was simply to 
increase the national education budget, especially for higher teacher salaries and improved 
technical and material resources. 
The largest task is to determine the actual cost for education, with necessary projec-
tions to meet future needs. In some of the participating countries, private schools have been 
established and may serve as a model for determining the required costs. In Azerbaijan, 
for example, a private school that is run primarily by local staff and faculty and serves local 
families, costs US$10,000 per student each year. With this amount, the school is able to 
print its own books, offer a range of extracurricular activities, and retain faculty. Teachers 
receive good salaries and merit-based increases. In return, they must participate in school 
events, be available after school to assist students who need help, and agree not to engage 
in private tutoring.
While this school caters to more prosperous families, it highlights the discrepancy 
between what is provided for schools by the state and what is needed. The experience of this 
school and others like it serves as an important reference point for revising state budgets for 
education. Many parents are unable to afford this option, but for those with college-bound chil-
dren, private education is seen as a means to make up for deficiencies in the public schools. 
Although national budgets do not generally cover all the costs of education, they do 
cover teacher salaries. However, the amount teachers receive is still low in comparison to 
other professionals with similar levels of education in the participating countries. The funds 
available to school principals or regional authorities often come with complicated require-
ments, such as prohibitions to transfer leftover funds from one item line to another where 
it might be put to better use. Principals are also restricted in how often they can request 
capital improvement funds. Both cases lead them to turn to local resources. 
Other issues related to finance are also missing at the policy level. The first is to 
employ budget tracking procedures to identify any leaks or bottlenecks in funding channels. 
Comparative audits of receipts and expenses across schools and their districts will help the 
cause of budget accountability. These procedures can help to suggest how legislation can 
be amended, what procedures might be developed, and what forms of enforcement are 
required. They will allow the regulation of parental payments to reduce inequalities in access 
to education and to diminish opportunities for corruption.
Once budgets and salaries are accurately assessed and provided for, policymakers must 
also review equity. As the survey pointed out, schools still need informal payments and will 
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continue to do so.31 Supplementary payments tend to marginalize children from low-income 
and disadvantaged households. Children from disadvantaged families require assistance so 
that they can contribute to and participate in all aspects of the schooling process. 
Corruption Cases in the Slovak Education Sector 
  The Slovak Press Agency reported in 2007 that Peter Levák, the former head 
of the school office in Trnava, was found guilty of accepting bribes. He was 
sentenced to 12 months in prison with two years probation. The district pros-
ecutor pushed for stronger punishment, but the court accepted a guarantee 
given by Levák’s fellow teachers at the secondary vocational school in Trnava, 
where he currently works, and took into account the length of the investigation 
procedure, as well as the fact that Levák had not been punished before. 
  Levák was found guilty on three counts of accepting bribes in exchange 
for help with admission to schools. In the first case, the police used an agent, 
for whom Levák promised admission to a university in exchange for 80,000 
SKK in September 2001 (24.9 SKK equals 1 U.S. dollar). He took another 
15,000 SKK for ensuring the admission of a student to a business academy. 
He requested 25,000 SKK from a parent in exchange for a promise to ensure 
the admission of his son to a grammar school in Vrbové or another secondary 
school in Trnava.
  In another case, an investigator from the Bureau of the Fight against 
Corruption at the Presidium of the Police Forces indicted 53-year-old Ján B. 
and 52-year-old L’udmila K. for accepting bribes. Ján B. requested 10,000 SKK 
during a phone call in exchange for ensuring the admission of a student to 
an external study program at the Constantine the Philosopher University in 
Nitra after the official admission procedure had already been finished. He 
took money from the father of the student and gave them to L’udmila K., who 
worked at the Student Office of this university and who admitted the student 
to university. Both individuals could be imprisoned for three to eight years. 
  This is the first court case concerning corruption in higher education in 
Slovakia. The chief of the Bureau of the Fight against Corruption, Tibor Gašpar, 
said that other cases will follow: “Our Bureau monitors the situation in the educa-
tion sector and I do not think that this is the last case from this area.” 
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Budgets should make allowances for the costs of both mandatory and voluntary activi-
ties and events, in addition to other expenses that children might incur. Otherwise, both 
access and equity will be affected. Charges for meals, transport, uniforms, texts, activities, 
or other educational expenses for at-risk households should be reduced or eliminated. While 
some nations may choose to set policy nationally, others may favor a provincial approach that 
draws on local resources rather than depending on national funding.
Flexibility needs to be legislated into systems to grant access to other resources. 
Philanthropy and taxation are both underdeveloped across the region. A combination of the 
two has proven beneficial for education financing in other parts of the world. Policymakers 
should develop such alternative means for raising revenue as tax incentives for private 
contributions to schools.
Despite positive changes, families may still feel that the costs associated with sending 
their child to school are too high. They may also feel that some of these costs are inappropri-
ate, misspent, or even too small. If so, parents may withdraw their children from school or 
limit their participation in extracurricular activities, studies, and programs. If this happens, 
the educational experience of the children may be diminished and the overall educational 
quality of the school may suffer.
Policymakers should review legislation and procedures to eliminate grey areas in 
which undesirable practices are allowed to occur. Rights and responsibilities as well as 
enforcement procedure need to be clearly delineated for all parties. The roles of parent 
associations and community overseers should be defined. Clear rules for collecting and 
disbursing school funds and a code of professional ethics need to be formulated. Legal 
protection from discrimination of any kind should be instituted for children of parents who 
decline to make payments. 
In making policy, authorities should hold open and comprehensive discussions with 
local experts, professionals, and other community representatives. Public discussion will 
encourage scrutiny of questionable practices (such as the marketing of commercial prod-
ucts in schools), and present an opportunity for the community at large to choose what is 
necessary and appropriate. 
The education sector should develop a culture of transparency and accountability. To 
this end, governments must work to improve schools’ resource management and enforce 
laws and regulations to support reforms. While policy development is underway, work is also 
required at the local level. Community actors, such as NGOs or other civil organizations, 
may serve as liaisons. Advocates for reform should aim not only to increase awareness and 
knowledge, but also to encourage all stakeholders to participate in bringing about change 
and managing it.
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Change Management
Change management requires the acceptance of responsibility and is based on the con-
cept of shared leadership. Rather than focus on awareness development or simple capacity-
building, advocacy efforts in education policy require action driven by attainable goals and 
informed by process and context. They must also secure the commitment of stakeholders 
in the already realized common goals. 
Actions without the commitment of stakeholders may backfire. For example, a youth 
group in Armenia, which borders Georgia and Azerbaijan, sought to fight corruption in 
universities. The group conducted a survey to identify 10 corrupt professors and used their 
limited results to create a shaming campaign. They posted pictures around the capital to 
garner attention, but raised more questions about their methods than curbing corrupt 
practices. As such, they ostracized potential partners and supporters. While this tactic 
has proven successful to motivate debtors in India and Spain, the students’ approach 
was largely seen as counterproductive, a misuse of publicity that diminished the prospect 
of change.32
Advocates are advised on the other hand to bring the parties together rather than to 
alienate them. One method is to encourage partners to learn about each other’s roles and 
responsibilities. In Making Services Work for the Poor, the World Bank (2004) represents 
these relationships as a triangle. Individuals are seen as clients in their relationship to ser-
vice providers and citizens in their relationship to government. The short route for them is 
to go directly to the service provider, with recourse to management should the service not 
be provided as agreed. The long route is to switch from client to citizen and go through 
government to try to have appropriate action taken. 
In transforming, monolithic or autocratic societies, this second route is unavailable. 
For countries making the transition to market economies and participatory governance, 
though, creating these relationships is not only a practical exercise in reform and restructur-
ing, but is also, according to the World Bank, a step on the way to reducing corruption. 
These are just first steps, though. The remaining steps will be difficult and potentially 
drawn out, judging by the examples of Uganda and Australia. In the mid-1990s, Uganda 
suffered drastic leakages of school funds, a problem shared with the former Soviet states. In 
1996, the country conducted a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) and a follow-up in 
2001. Due to the survey and resulting policy changes, leakages in capitation grants decreased 
from 80 percent to 20 percent (Reinikka and Smith, 2004).33 PETS helped Uganda to have 
a cleaner financing system, especially because follow-through requiring public announce-
ments of fund receipt, usage, and transfer made certain that few if any opportunities for 
leakages opened up (World Bank, 2004: 62–63, 185).
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Even this demanding project is only the beginning. The province of Victoria in Aus-
tralia began its own fight against informal payments back in 1973. Only in 2006 did the 
government pass the Education and Training Reform Act. It “ensures the provision of free 
instruction in the standard curriculum program, and empowers school councils to charge 
for goods and services used in the course of instruction and to raise funds” (2007: 4). 
From Research to Action
  After reviewing its PIPES results, NEPC’s member center in Azerbaijan real-
ized that we needed to bring the various stakeholders together and ensure that 
no one was left out. The Center for Innovations in Education produced a small 
video with a poignant story about informal payments. This short clip has since 
been shown on television, been used in training sessions around the country, 
and now is viewable on YouTube. 
  This public awareness campaign required adjustment though since 
the original video concerning payments could embarrass principals rather than 
helping them to espouse the cause. A local comedian was hired to play the role 
of the principal in the video so as to defuse potential antagonism. Additional 
efforts were made to include principals and to get them to talk with teachers 
and parents. 
  The project coordinator summarized by saying, “We’ve been amazed 
how such a simple thing as a video has generated more discussion of this study 
than any of our earlier advocacy efforts.”
 According to the reform, the Australian Department of Education and Early Child-
hood Development provides funding for the standard curriculum program, associated items, 
equipment, and operational costs. School councils are responsible for the development of 
policy and plans for resource management and allocation. In regards to parental payments, 
the councils are also given the right to request parental payments for essential education 
items (required), extras on a user-pays basis (optional), and invited financial contributions 
(voluntary). Specific guidelines on these charges are provided in writing and on the web.34 
These cases demonstrate the complexity of the task facing the NEPC countries. As an 
exploratory study, PIPES must stand as a call to action. In this chapter, we began by looking 
at who should pay for what. We then reviewed conclusions from the country teams in the 
areas of the payment process, community engagement, and policymaking. 
Together, a network of experts can facilitate changes based on the inputs provided 
here. They can indicate how informal payments can be used to support education. These 
inputs can inform policy and promote accountability. Fostering integrity and trust across 
all parties is also important, as is the reminder that integrated efforts will promote an even 
greater success. The final chapter returns us to this point.





Determining the level and impact of informal payments has been the focus of this book. As 
an exploratory study, PIPES proved a success. In earlier chapters, we discussed the initiation 
of the study, its results, the context of transformation, and the potential for change manage-
ment. The most important part of this undertaking though is to draw the line, to determine 
the starting point of change. 
There is no simple formula. Informal payments are a complex behavioral phenom-
enon, one that occupies the border between the appropriate and inappropriate. In some 
forms it is corruption, and scholarship in that field can give us our bearings. 
Hallack and Poisson (2007) point out that there is a fine line between what is considered 
“corrupt” and “noncorrupt” in a society, particularly when no rules or regulations are available. 
Even when rules and regulations do exist, they are not always followed or enforced. 
The basic lesson here is that there ought to be benchmarks. This exploratory study 
is an initial step in understanding this particular phenomenon in terms of scope, motiva-
tion, and impact. Across the region, we have been able to identify the form of informal 
payments and how they may be better structured. By drawing the line on three elements of 
the phenomenon, we found that it is possible to reduce ambiguities that lead to corruption, 
exclusion, and inequity. A more lasting solution requires an identification of the types of 
payments that are appropriate.
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Throughout this book reference has been made to “the line,” but what this line actu-
ally signifies and how it can be drawn requires further elaboration. In this chapter, we 
return briefly to the subject of transformation in order to define informal payments and 
plan further action.
Defining the Line
The process of social transformation (or social change) has been studied under many names, 
from culture shock at the personal level to the diffusion of innovations for entire societies. 
Most change diagrams describe a curve that rises slightly before dropping into a trough and 
then heading upwards again. This curve can be broken into stages known as the honeymoon, 
depression, recovery, and adjustment.35 
Depression is the lowest part of the curve. When dealing with personal change, 
experts in fields from psychology to mentoring new teachers advise people to minimize the 
depth and duration of depression by deciding to make a change and to take action. Similar 
advice can be offered to societies, but the decision to make a change is not so easy to make, 
especially the decision as to which change to make.
Research in this field is useful. For societal change, Everett Rogers used an S-curve 
to describe a diffusion of innovations that divides change into three general stages and 
identifies the parties necessary to take up the change (Rogers, 1983).36 Malcolm Gladwell 
improves upon this curve to show critical moments or “tipping points” that made the 
difference by reviewing various transformations seen around the world. He claims that 
once 5 percent of a population has taken up an innovation, it has become embedded. Under 
supporting circumstances, the rest of the population will take up the innovation once 
20 percent has accepted it (Gladwell, 2001).37 
For informal payments, the crux of the problem is their relative ambiguity. In an 
unstructured environment, it is difficult for a society at large to determine what is necessary 
and what is undesirable. Fortunately, the PIPES study has defined several key issues that can 
be useful in making this determination. 
The project team found at the outset that deciding what to do is easier said than done. 
Numerous questions were asked in the development of the survey tool and throughout its 
implementation. A joint meeting was held after all the countries completed field research 
to share results and consider how to analyze them. 
Team members agreed upon a categorization scheme for informal payments based on 
their use in the rest of the world. The categorization scheme had seemed like a good idea until 
the teams tried to match their results to it. As shown in Table 1, this attempt was informative 
but it failed to provide explanations. The team was unable to place types of informal payments 
into specific categories because the payments did not meet the definition supplied.
Table 1.
Payment Categories and Results
Description Survey Ressults
A Formal payments for mandatory educational 
activities such as lab fees for use in special-
ized science laboratories, textbook purchase or 
rental, and transportation. These activities are 
legal and often documented.
The survey included six kinds of formal payments—
textbooks, stationary, clothing/shoes, transporta-
tion, lunch, and security. The recognition of them 
by nearly all of the countries suggests that parental 
payment for necessary items for schooling is becom-
ing the norm across the region.
B Payment for elective educational activities for 
a group of students such as excursions to a 
museum or historical site or the purchase of 
sport uniforms to participate in a voluntary 
sport. These are legal and sometimes docu-
mented.
Payments in this category are still very uncommon 
for this region. Very high percentages report no 
payment for electives, which suggests that school 
outings and special program charges have yet to 
become commonplace.
C Private contributions to support general activi-
ties for the benefit of all children such as a gift 
of a computer for use by the class, flowers to 
demonstrate support for the teacher, or the 
repair of broken windows. These contributions 
are voluntary but often undocumented.
This category is problematic because many pay-
ments seem to fall into it, including donations, gifts, 
heating fees, repair contributions, and maintenance 
fees. As separate items, each of these received high 
responses for amount and frequency. This preva-
lence seems to indicate that these payments are not 
genuinely voluntary but are unofficially expected. 
D Informal payments for elective activities for 
use by an individual child who elects to par-
ticipate in those activities. These might include 
a telescope for those interested in astronomy 
or a new basketball for those who play on the 
school team. 
This category of payment was not covered in the 
questionnaires.
E Informal payments in reply to requests from 
the school or the school parent association. 
Since records are not kept, these payments are 
considered mandatory but informal.
Small regular payments are made to support class 
needs based on requests from teachers and the 
group of class parents. A parent association or prin-
cipal may also ask for payments for school needs.
F Payments to specific faculty members or to a 
specific administrator in exchange for a service 
or favor for a specific child. This can include a 
bribe to increase a child’s grade. These pay-
ments are undocumented; they are contrary to 
common international norms of professional 
conduct and are usually illegal.
No country reported a complete absence of these 
payments, which suggests that corrupt practices 
persist across the region.
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The first major problem was that since the education systems are still in various 
stages of development, formal standards of mandatory and voluntary payment had not yet 
been adopted. They were therefore difficult to enforce. Most payments had the appearance 
of being voluntary contributions. However, since schools had come to depend on these 
payments and they had come to be seen as regular expected payments, the concept of vol-
untarism could not be applied to almost half of them. 
Another problem was that schools and community members had limited experience 
handling cash or in-kind contributions, and no formal procedures existed to record them. 
Keeping bank accounts, drawing up budgets, tracking expenses, forecasting costs, or manag-
ing other resources were not typical responsibilities. Under the Soviets, direction was sup-
plied from the center, and in the periphery schools and institutions were merely responsible 
for carrying them out. 
Into independence, ad hoc means for keeping track of these transactions were adopted 
in many schools, but rarely were they shared with contributors. The funds were not reported 
as school income, except as official items monitored by education inspectors. Donors rarely 













Official record of fees for diplomas, exams, 
and textbooks




















D R A W I N G  T H E  L I N E   1 0 7
The research experience of the NEPC team proved invaluable, as did their personal 
experience as parents. Many had also worked as teachers, professors, and school officials, 
which gave them additional perspectives. All were products of the Soviet education system. 
When reviewing results, they saw that payments had two components, a discovery which 
led them to devise a matrix based on the variables of voluntary-mandatory participation and 
documented-undocumented transactions (Figure 1). 
While types of payments could be placed into this matrix, distinctions were not as clear 
as anticipated. Many items could be placed in several boxes at once. This scheme also did not 
lend itself to deciding what to do with informal payments. An element was missing. 
The team returned to the data to see what could be done with it. Following guidelines 
from the project leaders, each country team prepared a country study based on its results. 
After a review, the editorial team was able to break down the survey questions and responses 
into the categories of scope, motivation, and impact. 
The conclusions from each country study, which are the foundation for the chapter 
on advocacy, were similarly divided into three groups: payment process, community engage-
ment, and policy. Defining payments and standardizing a payment process will minimize 
the negative aspects of the scope of informal payments. Promoting and regulating engage-
ment will ensure appropriate motivation. Attending to certain issues at the policy level, such 
as financing and legal sanctions, will allow the management of impact. 
The ability to divide the results and conclusions into three parts led to the consid-
eration of whether a third variable was needed to understand categorization of informal 
payments. The first two variables, mandatory-voluntary and recorded-unrecorded, did not 
include the question of purpose, which was one of the first considered by the research team 
when constructing the survey tool. It promised to be a useful third variable. 
Building Blocks
Categorization and matrices were useful in describing payments, but they are not sufficient 
to draw the line. These variables address the question of accountability, the common thread 
running through findings of scope, motivation, and impact; accountability depends on the 
existence of the line. The benefit of making payments, which may give rise to a demand for 
accountability, is the third variable. 
Three variables represent three dimensions and are difficult to render on paper. Instead 
of a two-dimensional matrix like the one above, a three-dimensional matrix expressed as a 
cube was proposed (Figure 2). This cube is composed of eight smaller blocks, each of which 
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is determined by the three variables. These record payment (yes or no), form of payment 
(mandatory or voluntary), and benefit of payment (public or individual). 
Figure 2.
Building Blocks
Breakdown of Payment Types
Record Form Benefit
A Yes Mandatory Public
B No Mandatory Public
C Yes Voluntary Public
D No Voluntary Public
E Yes Mandatory Self
F No Mandatory Self
G Yes Voluntary Self
H No Voluntary Self
The variable “record” covers the various ways that payments can be recorded. This 
includes public announcements, ledger books, receipts, publicly posted lists, regular report-
ing, and other ways. Some payments require little record other than a yes or no. Others, 
especially if tax incentives or other forms of acknowledgment are desirable, need receipts, 
registers, and reports. 
Records will allow the full scope of payments to be brought into the open. The basic 
act of public reporting can break down barriers that might have prohibited review or criti-
cism. Records allow for funds to have identifiable costs and procedures attached to them 
and to be tracked and budgeted. 
Drawing the line for record-keeping means instituting clear procedures and tech-
niques for each type of payment for which documentation is desirable. No formal records 
exist for payments made by survey participants. It is clear from their responses that certain 
payments should be formally reported on, while for others the necessity is less certain. 
Mandatory and voluntary are both forms of involvement and participation. If everyone 
must participate (by making a payment) for the sake of the education process, that payment 























ence of the child. A voluntary payment is made without any external pressure; it is by the 
family’s choice. 
Drawing the line for form has shown that very few so-called voluntary payments are 
actually voluntary. Nearly all payments are presented to parents as being expected. Deter-
mining the forms of payments is critical. Consideration of this variable should open public 
discussion of the justification necessity and dispensation for the payment. Without agree-
ment on these matters, there can be no compliance or regulation.
Benefit is the third variable and indicates two types of beneficiaries—the public good 
or the child him/herself. Defining the beneficiary is an essential step to completing the dis-
cussion of why a payment is required, and how it is appropriate and must be processed. 
Drawing the line on benefit should be straightforward. It means that a payment 
achieves a concrete result for an individual, class group, or the school as a whole. It means 
that payments lead to the intended result and that the benefit is not used merely to advertise 
payment. For this variable, clear accounting procedures and oversight are necessary. 
To draw these lines more clearly, the demands on parents of each payment must be 
stated in terms of record, form, and benefit. The building-blocks approach helps determine 
where payments can go and, by doing so, eliminates their troubling ambiguity. 
Table 2 shows where the different payments for education might be ideally placed and 
identifies their current location. Since each variable has two choices, a total of eight blocks as 
described above is possible. The columns are named for the eight possible building blocks, 
using the letters A through H. Each row contains a possible parental payment for education 
across Eurasia as identified in the course of this study. The character “X” has been used to 
indicate the ideal location for each payment according to discussions and participant com-
ments. The character “O” shows how these payments are currently handled. Parentheses 
around characters suggest optional or multiple placement.
Ambiguous areas exist for all these variables, especially in reference to the findings 
written about in this report. Current payments are for the most part neither recorded nor 
fully mandatory nor voluntary. To emphasize the latter point, the heading “mandatory” is 
underlined to show that payments are expected and that noncompliance can have negative 
consequences. The comments area helps to highlight some of these issues. 
Differences among payment types became apparent after filling in the table. The first 
five payments have been designated as needing to be recorded and as being for the public 
good. A further determination of form is necessary, but this depends on the school’s ability 
to use other resources for these purposes. The final four are for self-interest and should be 
voluntary. They still require records to be kept.
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The middle four categories represent potentially corrupt practices. Grades, diplomas 
and exam results should never be bought and sold; such practices are not unknown. Where 
deemed appropriate, however, the receipt of diplomas or participation in special exams may 
be fee-based. Donations should be allowed in schools and should result from voluntary pay-
ments used for the public good of the school. Without record-keeping, it is difficult to assess 
whether the donation is made under, whether the donor or recipient is personally rewarded 
for it, and what the contribution is used for. 
The final four are payments made for activities supplementary to the basic require-
ments for schooling. Since extracurricular activities and extra group lessons can command 
school resources, including teachers, and require several students, proper recording is neces-
sary in order to gauge the extent of the activities they cover and to minimize the possibility 
of a forced donation. 
A glance at all the placements reveals a preference for record-keeping. While it is con-
ceivable that payments having become standardized records will no longer need to be kept, 
record-keeping is currently essential to drawing the line. The creation of accurate records 
is important not only to show the full costs of education, but also to ensure accountability. 
Record-keeping creates clear distinctions among payments (Figure 3). 
Figure 3.
Dividing the Cube
In short, all required payments need to be recorded. Other efforts aimed at control and 
compliance will fail without documentation. Without documentation, parents will be skepti-
cal of requests for payment and of the system of school management. 
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Nearly all legitimate forms of payments fall into the boxes A, C, E, or G. Almost all 
illegitimate payments fall into the boxes B, D, F, or H.
Figure 4.
To Record or Not Record
Matrix A: Recorded Matrix B: Not Recorded
Public Public
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In this final layout of Matrix A and B, Box H (not recorded, voluntary, and self- 
initiated) is the only space where records for ideal payments are not needed. Most but not all 
payments need to be recorded. The payments represented in Box H (for gifts and tutoring) 
have been reported as common and especially costly to parents. As discussed above, record-
keeping for this type of payment may be best postponed until the practice of record-keeping 
is established. A delay will promote the diminution and transformation of these activities. 
Establishing record-keeping procedures will begin to resolve the ambiguity inherent 
in the practice of informal payments. These procedures are the points of the first line that 
must be drawn. As Making Services Work for the Poor, the World Bank’s 2004 World Develop-
ment Report, says, a system of accountability must be put in place to ease transactions and 
service provision. This system can also minimize the potential for corrupt or undesirable 
behavior. It will require documentation, clear procedures, oversight, recourse, and more. 
The experience of implementing these measures should be a joint effort of the schools and 
communities whose involvement in this endeavor will itself help to build the familiarity and 
trust necessary to its success.
 
Down the Line
The single most significant problem, as outlined in each of the country reports, is a lack 
of clarity in what constitutes acceptable parental payments. In some instances, it is unac-
ceptable for parents to pay for school lunches, since the community is used to children’s 
receiving free lunches and in hard economic times households find it difficult to take on 
this additional expense. In other instances, a donation by a wealthy benefactor may be inter-
preted as a corrupt purchase of benefits for his child, especially where performance-based 
promotion is no longer standard practice. And in still others, contributions made to ease 
a child’s admission to school or college are treated as being no different from a regular 
tuition payment. 
Such large grey areas breed cynicism, destroying trust in education professionals, the 
integrity of educational institutions, and the broader system of governance. It diminishes 
the quality of education, may close doors for disadvantaged children, and socializes youth 
into cultures of corruption and system-avoidance. 
Informal payments take an economic toll as well. They put extreme pressures on 
families, many of whom pay the equivalent each year of one whole month of household 
income per child. Parents have in some cases contributed over 20 percent of the national 
budgetary allocation for education. With families shoring up the education system, the state 
has no incentive to institute reforms.
The end of the party state in former Soviet republics initiated a period of social 
upheaval. Not all the changes have been negative. The ubiquitous practice of parental con-
tributions across Eurasia might be considered a positive change. It represents the ability 
and willingness of parents to contribute to their children’s education. This capacity must be 
recognized and used appropriately to build other public-private partnerships. 
Informal payments in and of themselves are not bad. In fact, they represent an impor-
tant financial resource as well as a valuable linkage of the community to schooling. What 
is undesirable is that they are made in the shadows rather than the light. Other countries 
throughout the world use informal payments in ways that promote equity, accessibility, and 
quality of education. The countries of Eurasia should be no different. 
To draw the line for informal payments in Eurasia means first and foremost to estab-
lish accountability for all the parties involved in transactions. Rules and procedures must 
be clearly stated and vigorously enforced. Documentation must be transparent and pub-
licly available for review. Monitoring and review activities must include checks for quality, 
access, and equity. These changes will permit other lines to be drawn and other reforms to 
be achieved.
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The reward for this effort will be successful education reform. Sanctions and other 
enforcement measures will have to be adopted to ensure that changes do not exist on paper 
alone. Systemic reform will be accompanied by a change of behavior. Individuals must agree 
that a change is needed and demonstrate their commitment to it.
The countries of this region are undergoing a transformation. To call it a “transition” 
is to specify an origin and a destination. As discussed earlier, the populations, their educa-
tion systems, and their countries all began in the same position—as part of the Soviet Union. 
Where they are actually going has not been determined. Terms such as “open market,” 
“democracy,” and even “open society” are often used to describe this process. 
These countries’ transition to independence has not been easy, but steps can be taken 
to lessen the difficulties. Their populations will need to find a destination and plot their 
course. They can take their next step by drawing the line. 
Closing
 
The exploratory PIPES study began with a simple question, one that led the research team on 
a difficult journey. Together they learned to navigate an uncharted territory and were able to 
return with their bearings in place. This volume is a testimony to that journey and will serve 
as a guide for education reform and policymaking, especially in regards to education finance, 
school management, and corruption in education. It also holds the promise of promoting the 
causes of equity and access in schooling and still more generally of quality in education. 
The study revealed that parents have taken on a tremendous burden, amounting to 
a significant portion of household budgets. This shows the willingness of parents to sup-
port education despite personal and professional hardship. Parents believe in their children 
and want them to succeed. But parents also need to be able to believe in their schools and 
governments. 
Education need not be completely free. Instead it should be a collaborative process 
and shared expense that serves individuals, communities, and society at large. This study 
demonstrates with many examples the need to introduce accountability and improve financ-
ing. All parties are able and willing, but the legal framework, compliance mechanisms, and 
managerial skills must first be created or enhanced.
The message of this book is that informal payments deserve the attention of the par-
ties concerned. As currently practiced, these payments reveal a poorly functioning system 
of governance. They threaten to deny a fair education to children, and not just to those from 
disadvantaged households. The currency of such payments has already affected a generation 
of children who have been socialized into accepting informal solutions, rather than believing 
in formal structures and institutions. If the practice of informal payments goes unchecked, 
the consequences can only broaden. The full impact will be felt by national economies in 
the very near future. 
Small steps can lead to large changes. Education across the region is changing. This 
study has raised awareness, but regulations to formalize parental payments must now be 
introduced. By drawing the line with records and receipts, parents and schools can alter the 
course of change. By investing prudently in their local schools and community, they invest 
in their children and their future. This is our underlying hope.
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Chapter Notes
1. The PIPES country reports can be found online at http://www.edupolicy.net  current 
projects  PIPES.
2. The difference in organizational level and capacity of parent associations across the region 
varies widely. Including them in the survey would have masked important differences in their 
operation, legitimacy and effect. 
3. Originally, it was thought that local and regional school officials could provide another rich 
dataset, but the reality of politics made it such that gathering this data would have significantly 
compromised ability of research teams to work within the overall school systems to collect other 
data.
4. Since development has mostly been concentrated in the capitals of these republics or on 
areas near important resources or routes, provincial towns and cities often have fewer educational 
opportunities and lower levels of economic activity in comparison with the capital.
5. The individual country reports for PIPES can be found online on NEPC’s website (http://
www.edupolicy.net).
6. This figure can not be confirmed due to a lack of information. 
7. These totals do not add up. In Kazakhstan where the highest amounts were reported in 
each category by teachers, the combined contribution equaled only 85.6 percent. Similarly, prin-
cipals in Slovakia reported a combined total of 73.9 percent. 
8. No data for parents in Georgia was included for this question. 
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9. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
(2007), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision. CD-ROM Edition—Data in digital 
form (POP/DB/WUP/Rev. 2007). http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/
hum-sets.htm.
10. Source: The 2008 World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency: Langley. 2008. Online edi-
tion (accessed 5 March 2009). Most economic figures are 2008 estimates. 
11. Poverty is often described as living on one dollar a day, a rate used to describe conditions 
across Africa. In the re-developing nations of Eurasia, the World Bank and IMF established this 
rate to reflect different standards of living. 
12. Shuttle or suitcase trade increased as a broad phenomenon across the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc during the early 1990s as borders opened. Individuals and families traveled to other 
countries to buy cheap goods so that they could sell them at home for a small profit. With the failure 
or slowing of other sectors, shuttle trade has been an informal response to generate income.
13. Source: The 2008 World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency: Langley. 2008. Online edi-
tion (accessed 5 March 2009).
14. All figures from 2006, except for Kazakhstan (2005), Latvia (2004), and Slovakia 
(2005). 
15. Figure from 2006, except for Latvia and Slovakia where data is from 2004. 
16. It is interesting to note that this difference may even be larger given that the majority of 
the figures are for 2006 when some countries began to increase expenditure amounts in educa-
tion. Official statistics though across countries were not yet available for inclusion. 
17. Source: The 2008 World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency: Langley. 2008. Online edi-
tion (accessed 5 March 2009).
18. While part of this problem rests on university entrance examinations that emphasize rote 
memorization, fault might also be found in slow curriculum reform.
19. For a more detailed essay on this phenomenon, please refer to Lepisto and Kazimzade, 
2009. 
20. The survey is at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006 
(last accessed 10 May 2009). Countries are evaluated on the basis of several series and assessed 
on the scale of 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (clean).
21. Tables can be accessed online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17&
year=2006 (last accessed 10 May 2009). Countries are evaluated separately on performance over 
the preceding year on a scale of 1 (good) to 7 (worse).
22. These figures come from Norris, Pippa (2001) Making Democracies Work: Social Capital 
and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies. Cambridge: KSG Faculty Working Paper Series, Harvard 
University. This measurement comes directly from Putnam’s definition of social capital.
23. The study by the Institute for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR) about NGOs 
in Azerbaijan revealed a high level of mistrust in these organizations by the population as well 
as a high level of ignorance regarding their role and purpose (Nelson 1999).
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24. It should be noted that Soviet era scoring had a tendency to over-report or to bias reports 
so that the subject population would look better than it actually was.
25. Source: 2007/2008 Human Development Reports (2008), The UN Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ last accessed 20 May 2009). These reports 
use a system based on a group of variables to come up with a score for their Human Development 
Index (HDI). This information has been adapted from the online National Human Development 
Report prepared by the United Nations Development Programme. The Human Development 
Index (HDI) is based on a composite score and then each country is ranked out of the total num-
ber of 179 countries. The higher the ranking, the better the level of human development is. 
26. The education index is calculated on the adult literacy rate (% aged 15 or older) from 1995-
2005 against the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education 
(%), 2005. The closer the rate is to 1.000, the better it is. 
27. Wage amounts used here are from 2006. They were subsequently increased in nearly all 
of the subject countries. 
28. See http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/section.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=3
23&tpid=68 (accessed 31 May 2009). 
29. Please see http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/educa-
tion/ corruption_education/ (accessed 31 May 2009). 
30. Source: http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/health/ser-
vice_delivery/ informal_payments (accessed 31 May 2009). 
31. This position is supported by the fact that OECD surveys of developed countries now 
include private contributions as a target in their research methodology.
32. See “Raising a din over loan default” from the BBC News on 20 August 2005 from (http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4168766.stm, last accessed 1 June 2009) and “Spain’s 
Showy Debt Collectors Wear a Tux, Collect the Bucks” from the Wall Street Journal on 11 October 
2008 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122369424667425525.html?mod=todays_us_page_one, 
last accessed 1 June 2009). 
33. This volume, entitled Public expenditure tracking surveys in education, was written by Ritva 
Reinikka and Nathanael Smith for the International Institute for Educational Planning for their 
series on ethics and corruption in education. It covers Peru, Uganda, and Zambia, each of which 
present unique cases. At the time of this volume, the only country in Eurasia that had conducted 
PETS was Albania.
34. See Parent Payments in Victorian Government Schools at www.education.vic.gov.au/
aboutschool/lifeatschool/parentpayments.htm, last accessed 1 June 2009.
35. See, for example, the personal change chart by J.M. Fisher available on his website, www.
businessballs.com. 
36. Rogers, Everett M. (1983). The Diffusion of Innovation. Macmillan: New York. 
37. Gladwell, Malcolm. (2000). The Tipping Point. Little Brown: New York.
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foundations network to encompass the United States and more than 70 countries in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Each Soros foundation relies on the expertise of boards 
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www.soros.org
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The Education Support Program (ESP) and its partners are involved in activism, research, 
policy, and practice that promote education justice. Education justice provides a largely 
“political” lens through which to address issues of inequality and discrimination within the 
education sector while attending to inherent systemic, professional, and resource challenges. 
Central themes include supporting education renewal in postconflict countries, promoting 
equal education and inclusion for marginalized groups, strengthening critical thinking and 
education quality, and developing a progressive and forward-looking civil society engage-
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mainly in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe, the Middle East, Russia, South Asia, and 
Africa, as well as at a global level.
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and independent professional networks, such as the Network of Education Policy Centers 
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ples of recent and ongoing ESP initiatives include the following: a research project in South 
Eastern Europe which combines two robust scientific surveys that inform evidence-based 
advocacy for equitable and meaningful engagement of parents in the life of the school; a 
landmark OECD review of education policies in Central Asia on special education needs aris-
ing from disability, learning difficulties, and disadvantage; a project that partners a variety 
of public, private, and civil society institutions to promote education and cooperation in the 
North and South Caucasus; a regional initiative in East Africa (Uwezo) that combines civic 
activism and a focus on learning outcomes to push for increased quality; and an initiative 
in Swaziland that presents the school as the center of comprehensive care and support for 
vulnerable children in a manner that strengthens government capacity for service delivery 
and improves the quality of schools. 
www.soros.org/initiatives/esp
Network of Education Policy Centers
The Network of Education Policy Centers (NEPC) is an international membership NGO with 
28 members in 20 countries. It addresses the need for independent and information-based 
policy analysis, advocacy for equity, and effective, sustainable solutions in education policy 
processes.
The vision of NEPC is to develop into a strong network of leading education policy organiza-
tions and experts, an international actor with local and regional expertise in education policy 
that promotes the values of an open, democratic, multicultural, and pluralistic society in 
education. Policy in our understanding involves implementation and evaluation of current 
policies as well as the formulation of new policies. 
The mission of NEPC is to promote flexible, participatory, evidence-based, and transparent 
education policies that are embedded with open society values. By implementing this mis-
sion we undertake proactive policy initiatives as well as advocacy and monitoring activities 
that will ensure that governments and national education systems deliver quality educational 
experiences to all citizens. 
www.edupolicy.net
From Awareness Building 
to Advocacy 
The PIPES Case
Advocacy begins with the identification of a problem and culminates in garnering support 
for a proposed solution, but there are steps in between. Organizations typically focus on 
raising political will and developing popular awareness. Actual problem-solving, though, is 
a long-term process.  Over the past decade, NEPC members have been developing advocacy 
expertise. This is especially true of the representatives in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
where community-based organizations and advocates are relative newcomers. A colleague 
in Azerbaijan shares her organization’s experience:
My first experience on evidence-based advocacy began with the Private Tutoring 
Monitoring Project, in which our team learned how to write a policy brief, how to 
approach the media, and how to communicate our message. With PIPES, we found 
new ways that to some extent were more creative and exciting and allowed us “to 
give the floor to the students.” We all learned to initiate dialogue by taking a fresh, 
proactive look at everyday experience.
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In our country all research institutes belong to the state and usually they were 
engrossed in fundamental themes in education. The possibility of conducting a 
monitoring study with quick results and measurable outcomes was a great discovery 
for these practitioners and other applied researchers in this part of the world. 
Monitoring studies shifted the nature of our work from analysis to participatory 
advocacy.
For example, after the PIPES study, we realized that we needed to bring the various 
stakeholders together and ensure that no one was left out. We decided to produce 
a small video with a poignant story about informal payments. This short clip has 
since been shown on television, been used in training sessions around the country, 
and now is viewable on YouTube.1 We’ve been amazed how such a simple thing as 
a video has generated more discussion of this study than any of our earlier advocacy 
efforts.
An advocacy coordinator in Kazakhstan shared how they gained advocacy champions 
for policymaking: 
If you are sharing your recommendations with a large audience through publication 
of leaflets, you cannot be sure when and how your message will reach them. For 
PIPES, we targeted specific policymakers individually. Arranging one-on-one 
meetings with the people responsible for education and sharing our study results 
proved to be a successful advocacy approach for our project. 
It was important to gain the interest and commitment of these individuals by 
providing reliable information about this widespread phenomenon. Including a map 
of Kazakhstan, which shows average expenditure by region and city, was a helpful 
visual aid in our discussions. In fact, the Head of the Educational Commission 
included our paper in the agenda for the next meeting of the Parliament.
The seven Eurasian countries in this study each face their own particular economic, 
political, and educational challenges. However, they share a common history and a dis-
tinctive ability to support one another. NEPC provides just such regional support through 
advocacy, networking, consultancy, and other kinds of partnership. With each project, these 
partnerships become stronger and more effective. 
Advocacy for NEPC has been an evolutionary process, as member centers moved 
from research and awareness-building to managing change. The case of informal payments 
1.  This video is used for training programs with school personnel, parent committees, and others. 
An English-language digital version is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=ETDW4pJjYEo, 
last accessed 10 April 2009.
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presents a special challenge. Rather than being armed with a list of recommendations from a 
study, an agenda for a more integrated approach has been adopted. At every phase of design, 
research, and analysis, the team has kept the study’s ultimate purpose, advocacy, in view. 
This work proposes to facilitate the process of drawing the line. It recommends that 
NEPC members and partners work together to manage the scope of informal payments, 
keep the voluntary and mandatory discrete, and to create policies that promote the ends of 
equity and access. Professionalism, accountability, and transparency should be an integral 
part of each proposed measure. 

Drawing the Line: Parental Informal Payments for Education 
across Eurasia is a cross-national study by the Network of 
Education Policy Centers on the character and frequency of private 
informal payments made by parents and families on behalf of their 
children attending primary and secondary schools in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Slovakia, and Tajikistan. 
The study examines the difference between the positive and 
negative implications of this unexplored issue in the education 
systems of transitioning societies. Since informal payments are 
widely accepted, but rarely open to public review, drawing the line 
implies that all stakeholders must discuss and decide where the 
line between acceptable and unacceptable private payments 
should be drawn. The central concern is how to ensure that 
educational reform takes into account the real cost of education 
and creates an equitable system that is accessible to all.
This study addresses researchers, educational professionals, 
community advocates, and policymakers working on education 
ﬁnance, anticorruption measures in education, school leadership, 
school governance, and parents’ involvement. It was supported 
by the Open Society Institute’s Education Support Program, 
which facilitates and informs the pursuit of education reforms 
that reﬂect open society values. 
